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TWO PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL'S INDEPENDENCE
Joshua L Schwartz*
The Office of the Solicitor General is chartered by law to conduct
virtually all litigation in the Supreme Court on behalf of the United
States and federal agencies and officials. There is a second less public
and less glamorous side to the Solicitor General's duties: the Solicitor
General is authorized to determine, in most government cases, whether
an appeal should be taken from an adverse decision of a lower court to an
appellate court. Finally, when jurisdiction to review further an adverse
decision of a lower court lies in the Supreme Court of the United States,
these two kinds of authority, to conduct Supreme Court litigation and to
govern the flow of appeals, merge. In many respects this is the most
critical function of all that is vested by law in the Solicitor General: the
authority and the responsibility to determine whether the government
should seek further review of an adverse decision in the Supreme Court.
Although all of these functions are carried out pursuant to authority del-
egated by the Attorney General of the United States, they have generally
been carried out in modern times by the Solicitor General with very little
intervention by the Attorney General or his personal staff.1
* Associate Professor of Law, National Law Center, George Washington University.
B.A., 1973, Harvard College; J.D., 1976, Cornell University Law School. The author served
as an Assistant to the Solicitor General from 1981-1985. The views expressed herein are per-
sonal and do not purport to represent the views of any agency of the United States government
or of any occupant of the office of Solicitor General. I would like to thank my colleague Beth
Nolan for reading a draft of this Article and for making many useful suggestions pertaining
thereto. I would also like to thank Melinda F. Levitt for her diligence as my research assistant.
1. As is recounted in more detail in a 1977 Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum for the
Attorney General, the position of Solicitor General was created by the Judiciary Act of 1870,
ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162 (1870). Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General: Role of
the Solicitor General, 1 Op. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 228 (1977), reprinted in 21 Loy. L.A.L.
Rnv. 1089, 1089-97 (1988) [hereinafter 1977 Memorandum]. The modern version of this pro-
vision is found at 28 U.S.C. § 518 (1982 & Supp. 1987). That provision assigns responsibility
for the conduct of Supreme Court litigation on behalf of the United States jointly to the Attor-
ney General and to the Solicitor General. The statutory language makes it clear that the
authority of the Solicitor General is subordinate to that of the Attorney General. The Attorney
General has the authority to conduct Supreme Court litigation himself or herself, or to direct
that an officer of the United States Department of Justice other than the Solicitor General
fulfill this responsibility in a particular case.
The preeminence of the Solicitor General is better reflected in the Department of Justice
regulations that govern the structure and organization of the Department. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20
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In his recent book, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the
Rule of Law,2 Lincoln Caplan examines in detail the history and the role
of the Solicitor General's Office. He argues that the Solicitor General has
traditionally enjoyed a striking-albeit bounded-measure of indepen-
dence from control by his immediate superior, the Attorney General of
the United States, and from his ultimate executive branch superior, the
President of the United States, in carrying out his Supreme Court litiga-
tion and appeal-regulation responsibilities.3 Caplan further argues that
this measure of independence has been substantially reduced during the
presidency of Ronald Reagan. This erosion resulted, according to the
author's account, from unremitting pressure from ideological partisans
within the Reagan administration to make the Office of the Solicitor
General serve as an advocate before the courts for these partisans' own
political and social agenda. The Tenth Justice reports that the effort to
"politicize" the Solicitor General's function was captained by Attorney
General Edwin Meese, III and Assistant Attorney General-for the Civil
(1987) provides for the Solicitor General to carry out the functions described in the text. With
respect to the conduct of Supreme Court litigation, these regulations are simply the vehicle by
which the Attorney General records how he has exercised the authority granted him by 28
U.S.C. § 518. In vesting the authority to approve or disapprove government appeals from
adverse decisions of the lower courts in the Solicitor General, the regulations draw on author-
ity granted the Attorney General by other statutes, such as 28 U.S.C. §§ 516 and 519, to
conduct litigation on behalf of the United States, federal agencies, and federal officials.
Of course the authority of the Solicitor General to regulate the flow of federal government
appellate litigation is limited by the existence of "independent litigating authority"-the power
to conduct litigation without recourse to the Department of Justice that is granted to certain
federal agencies by statute. The subject of such independent litigating authority is an impor-
tant one that lies beyond the perimeter of this Article. See generally J. MASHAW & R. MER-
RILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 163-72 (2d ed. 1985),
and sources cited therein. Generally speaking, however, 28 U.S.C. §§ 516 and 519 codify the
rule that all federal government litigation is to be carried out under the auspices of the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Attorney General, except when express provision to the contrary is
made by statute. Such statutory exceptions are fairly common, but they almost never extend
to authorizing independent conduct of litigation at the Supreme Court level. The upshot is
that with rare exceptions, such as the Federal Elections Commission, which is authorized to
conduct its own Supreme Court litigation, the Solicitor General's monopoly on the conduct
and authorization of federal government Supreme Court litigation is complete. By contrast,
the Solicitor General's authority to govern government appeals from adverse trial court deci-
sions has significant exceptions. Whenever the agency involved has independent litigating au-
thority as far as the court of appeals, it can take an appeal without the Solicitor General's
approval.
2. L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF
LAW (1987). An earlier version of the same study appeared in The New Yorker. Caplan,
Annals of Law: The Tenth Justice-I, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 10, 1987, at 29-58; Caplan,
Annals of Law: The Tenth Justice-II, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 17, 1987, at 30-62. (Herein-
after references to L. CAPLAN are to the book version.)
3. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 33-50.
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Rights Division-William Bradford Reynolds.4 Caplan argues that the
effort was made to use the Solicitor General's Office as a "bully pulpit"
not only to press for particular changes in legal doctrine on issues of
particular concern to ideologists within the Reagan Administration, but
also systematically to seek to reduce the role of the courts in our govern-
ment, in favor of the authority of the "political branches," especially the
Executive.5 In this process, Caplan asserts, the "special relationship" of
confidence that has traditionally existed between the Supreme Court and
the Solicitor General's Office has suffered significantly.6 The Tenth Jus-
tice asserts that the change reduced the efficacy of government advocacy
before the Supreme Court, both in "politically sensitive" cases and more
routine ones.7 More than that, however, Caplan argues forcefully that
these developments were aimed at undermining the "rule of law" itself.8
Predictably, exception has been taken to Caplan's thesis by support-
ers of the Reagan Administration and defenders of the activities of the
Reagan Justice Department.9 Although the publication of The Tenth
Justice undoubtedly prompted the development of this symposium, the
purpose of this Article is neither to enter directly into the debate stirred
by Caplan's reporting, nor to offer an account of the functioning of the
Office of the Solicitor General in earlier eras or administrations. I do
propose to offer here a normative argument about the role of the Solicitor
General, focusing on the question of independence. In approaching this
problem, I try to answer two questions. First, what does the Supreme
Court expect from the Solicitor General? Second, what obligations, if
any, does the Solicitor General owe to the legislative branch of govern-
ment-the Congress?
A more conventional approach might focus on the problem of the
independence of the Solicitor General from the perspective of the execu-
tive branch. Such an analysis would examine the tension between the
independence of the Solicitor General and the authority of the President
over the executive branch as a whole, as well as the relationship of the
Solicitor General to the Attorney General. That analysis will be left to
other contributors to this symposium. In addition, this symposium issue
4. Id at 81-135.
5. Id at 65-80.
6. Id at 255-67.
7. Id at 235-67.
8. Id at 65-80, 268-77.
9. See, eg., Lauber, An Exchange of Views: Has the Solicitor's Office Become Politicized?,
Legal Times, Nov. 2, 1987, at 22, col. 1. (Albert G. Lauber, Jr. served as a Deputy Solicitor
General in 1986 and 1987 and earlier served as an Assistant to the Solicitor General for several
years.) See also Caplan's response to Lauber, id. at 22, col. 3.
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of the Loyola Law Review reproduces a memorandum prepared for At-
torney General Griffin Bell, at the start of the Carter Administration,
that addresses the issue from the perspective of the executive branch.'0
That memorandum, prepared in the Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel, provides a useful statement of the rationale for independence of
the Solicitor General from the perspective of the executive branch." I The
heart of that argument is that the independence of the Solicitor General
serves as a useful internal check or balance that will help to steer the
more politically inclined Attorney General, and the President, in fulfil-
ling their constitutional responsibility to take care that the laws are faith-
fully executed. 2
As indicated, I will explore here the distinctive perspectives of the
judicial and legislative branches on the appropriate conduct of the Solici-
tor General. Specifically, I will argue that a tradition of limited indepen-
dence of the Solicitor General serves an invaluable function for the
judical branch. Adherence to this tradition makes it possible for the
courts to delegate to the executive control over a large and critical share
of their dockets. Significant benefits for both the executive and the judi-
cial branches result from this arrangement. Second, I will argue that the
independence of the Solicitor General enables him to discharge impor-
10. 1977 Memorandum, supra note 1, reprinted in 21 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1089, 1089-97
(1988).
11. Four justifications for the independence of the Solicitor General are discussed: (1) the
need to ensure that the government speaks with a single unified voice in the Supreme Court;
(2) the assistance provided to the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General in screening the
Court's docket, providing objective accounts of factual records in cases before the Court, and
providing expertise bearing on the legal issues before the Court; (3) the desirability of promot-
ing the orderly development of the law by presentation of appropriate issues in appropriate
cases; and (4) the desire to prevent improper considerations, whether political or otherwise,
from entering into the government's Supreme Court advocacy. 1977 Memorandum, supra
note 1, at 230-31, reprinted in 21 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 1089, 1092-93 (1988). Some of these
justifications are stated in terms that do not directly address the executive branch's distinctive
interests. The Memorandum also asserts that the Attorney General cannot, as a practical
matter, be expected to fulfill these functions, because of his dual role "as a policy and legal
adviser to the President." Id. at 232, reprinted in 21 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1089, 1094 (1988).
Moreover, the Memorandum advises that the Solicitor General's independence permits him to
play a unique role in assisting the President and Attorney General to fulfill their constitutional
responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws. Id. at 232, 234 reprinted in 21 Loy. L.A.L.
Rv. 1089, 1093-94, 1096 (1988). The Memorandum treats the independence of the Solicitor
General as a useful sub-constitutional device, a kind of internal check and balance, that offers a
safeguard against adoption of unsound legal positions by the executive branch. The Office of
Legal Counsel Memorandum clearly insists, however, that the President and Attorney General
retain the ultimate responsibility for the litigating position of the United States-a responsibil-
ity that is to be exercised only in the most unusual case. Id., reprinted in 21 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
1089, 1094-94, 1096 (1988).
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See supra note 11.
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tant obligations that run to the Congress concerning the process of gov-
ernment litigation. The tradition of independence of the Solicitor
General serves an important role in limiting the tensions that result from
executive responsibility for government litigation that vitally affects legis-
lative interests. I do not suggest that some measure of independence of
the Solicitor General from either presidential control or the supervision
of the Attorney General is constitutionally mandated; nor is it required
by any statutory authority. 3 Indeed, a powerful argument could be
made that any such statutory requirement would itself be unconstitu-
tional. 14 But I do suggest that the operation of the Office of the Solicitor
General in the independent mode described as the traditional one by The
Tenth Justice serves a significant role in maintaining equilibrium and
comity between the political branches and between those branches and
the judicial branch. It is, in short, an extra-constitutional safeguard for
separation of powers. As such, this tradition is a good and valuable one
that ought to be preserved. Although the safeguards for such a tradition
are, under my analysis, exclusively political, a fuller understanding of the
reasons for fostering it may facilitate its defense.1"
I. UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA: THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
What has the Supreme Court had to say about the Solicitor General
and the function that he or she performs? One might think that the
Court would be circumspect on this sensitive matter, and in general that
is so-at least in respect to on-the-record statements. In fact, however,
although little appreciated as such, the Court has recently spoken quite
distinctly-and "officially"-about the function of the Solicitor General.
I suggest that these comments, lodged in a 1984 opinion for a unanimous
13. See supra note 1 for the statutory basis establishing the position of Solicitor General.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 113-18.
15. In a book review of The Tenth Justice for the Washington Post, Michael Gartner sug-
gested that all candidates for President be asked these questions:
"1. If you're elected, who will be solicitor general in your administration?
2. And precisely how do you view the role of the solicitor general?"
Gartner, Washington Post, Oct. 25, 1987, Book World, at 1, col. 4.
It plainly is part of the purpose of Caplan's book to draw the attention of the public to the
significance of the activities of a heretofore obscure government bureau and thereby to raise
the level of political debate about the administration of justice in our federal government. It is
probably unrealistic, of course, to expect the functioning of the Solicitor General's Office to
become a campaign issue. It may be much more realistic to expect the Congress, in discharg-
ing its oversight and confirmation functions, to monitor the manner in which the Solicitor
General discharges his or her duties.
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Court in United States v. Mendoza,16 are richly suggestive of the value of,
and the reasons for, a considerable measure of independence in the per-
formance of the Solicitor General's function. At the same time, they do
not reflect a simplistic or absolute view of this independence. Some of
the implications of Mendoza for the subject of this symposium are readily
apparent on the face of the Court's opinion; others are more subtly
stated; and some are to be discerned only from what the Court did not
say, rather than what it did.
The question in Mendoza was whether collateral estoppel precluded
the United States or one of its agencies from relitigating a question of
law, previously decided adversely to the government, in a separate pro-
ceeding against different parties. In short, the issue was whether the old
rule of "mutuality"-the demise of which is made known to every first
year law student in Civil Procedure-remains alive and in force when the
issue is one of law and the party seeking to relitigate is an instrumentality
of the United States government. 7 In Mendoza, the Court held that
nonmutual collateral estoppel does not apply so as to preclude relitiga-
tion by the government in this situation. The Supreme Court gave two
kinds of reasons for adopting this rule. The first constellation of factors
was pragmatic in nature and focused on judicial administration. The sec-
ond rationale, by contrast, was rooted in an appraisal of the political
nature of the process of government. It is the interaction of the twin
rationales offered by the Court that ultimately provides the strongest
support for the tradition of "independence" of the Solicitor General.
A. The Judicial Administration Rationale
The Court observed in United States v. Mendoza 18 that the federal
16. 464 U.S. 154 (1984). During my tenure in the Solicitor General's Office, see supra note
*, I was the attorney primarily responsible for preparation of the brief for the United States in
this case and the companion case, United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984).
17. Under the mutuality doctrine, neither party to a legal action could invoke collateral
estoppel against the other based on a finding in a prior proceeding unless both parties to the
second case were bound by the judgment in the first. The premise was that it was unfair to
allow a party to use a judgment adverse to his party opponent against that opponent unless the
party opponent could have used a favorable judgment rendered in the prior proceeding against
the first party. Because due process prohibits use of collateral estoppel against one not a
party-or in privity with a party-in the prior proceeding, this mutuality rationale provided a
party who had litigated and lost an issue in a prior action the opportunity to relitigate that
issue in a second action against a new adversary. See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326-27 (1979). Key modem decisions rejecting the mutuality limitation on collateral
estoppel are Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. 322; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971); and Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19
Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
18. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
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government stands in a unique position among litigants in the federal
courts. Because of the functions of the federal government that give rise
to a large volume of litigation, frequently of a repetitive nature, "the
Government is more likely than any private party to be involved in law-
suits against different parties which nonetheless involve the same legal
issues."'19 Moreover, the recurring legal questions presented in this re-
petitive litigation are likely to be of unusual public importance, and are
often issues that, by their nature, can only arise in litigation to which a
federal agency or officer is a party.20 As a result of these factors, the
Court concluded, application of nonmutual collateral estoppel against
the government on issues of law "would substantially thwart the develop-
ment of important questions of law by freezing the first final decision
rendered on a particular legal issue."'2 1 Under such a regime, of course,
such premature "freezing" into place of lower court precedents could be
avoided only if the government were to routinely seek appellate review-
up through the Supreme Court level-of every adverse decision rendered
on a controlling question of law. This would have effected a radical
change in the Solicitor General's existing practice, described in more de-
tail below, of exercising a high degree of selectivity in seeking appellate
review of lower court decisions adverse to the government. In addition,
the Supreme Court would have to accommodate these additional govern-
19. Id. at 160.
20. Id. at 159-60.
The Court may also have relied on the fact that in government litigation-in contrast to
much private litigation-the government effectively speaks for the interest of the many, and
not merely for a private or parochial interest. Indeed, in this portion of its opinion the Court
relied on Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980) and INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973)
(per curiain). See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159. Standefer disapproved application of nonmutual
collateral estoppel against the government in the setting of a criminal case. Hibi rejects the
application of equitable estoppel against the United States. Each of these cases makes the
point that because the federal government is representing a public interest rather than a private
one, the balance between the importance of reaching a correct and lawful result in the particu-
lar case or proceeding, on the one hand, and the importance of judicial economy or consistency
considerations, on the other, shifts in favor of the former. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 24-25;
Hibi, 414 U.S. at 8.
In invoking Standefer and Hibi, however, the Mendoza Court seemed to emphasize the
volume of government litigation and the innate importance of the kind of issues of law litigated
by the federal government, and to downplay to some extent the special importance of reaching
a correct result that flows from the public nature of the interests asserted by the government.
See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159. (Both kinds of arguments had been made in the government's
brief to the Court. See Brief for the United States at 26-28, United States v. Mendoza, 464
U.S. 154 (1984) (No. 82-849)). Perhaps this choice of emphasis is deliberate, but it is scarcely
clear in the Court's opinion. It may be reading too much into Justice Rehnquist's relatively
compressed comments on this point to be sure whether he, or the Court, meant to embrace,
reject or even comment on the latter rationale.
21. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
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ment certiorari petitions on its crowded docket unless it were willing to
allow the lower court decision to become binding in all future cases on
the government.22  This alternative scenario for the conduct of govern-
ment appellate litigation was distinctly unappealing to the Court.
Justice Rehnquist made clear that rejection of nonmutual collateral
estoppel against the government was not dictated entirely by the needs or
wants of its own deliberative process.23 The same considerations were
applicable at the court of appeals level.24 In short, the Court concluded
that to allow non-mutual collateral estoppel against the government on
recurring questions of law would both "disserve the [judicial] economy
interests in whose name estoppel is advanced, ' 25 and produce less fully
considered and less correct decision-making by the judicial system
viewed as a whole.26
Supporting the Court's pragmatic rationale was the Court's assess-
ment of the manner in which the Solicitor General carried out appellate
litigation on behalf of the federal government. The Solicitor General had
taken for granted that nonmutual collateral estoppel would not be ap-
plied against the government on questions of law.27 The Court's decision
22. Id. The Court complained that this would adversely affect both its docket manage-
ment and its deliberation on the merits of the cases to which it gives plenary consideration. To
allow nonmutual collateral estoppel against the federal government on questions of law would
virtually rule out the creation of conflicts among the circuits in federal government litigation-
a primary device used by the Court to regulate its discretionary docket. At the same time, in
those cases selected for consideration on the merits, the Court would deprive itself of the
benefit of what is often described as "marination" or "percolation"-"the benefit (the Supreme
Court] receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before
this Court grants certiorari." Id.; see, eg., Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some
Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1109 (1987).
23. Mendoza has been criticized on the ground that the Court's preference for "percola-
tion" is satisfied at a high cost in terms of the time of lower courts. Effectively, these critics
argue, Mendoza effects an allocation of labor between the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts that is satisfactory for agency litigants and for the Supreme Court, but onerous for the
lower federal courts. See, Levin & Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United States Govern-
ment, 70 IowA L. REV. 113, 119-20 (1984) (citing Pharmadyne Laboratories, Inc. v. Kennedy,
466 F. Supp. 100, 108 n.16 (D.N.J. 1979)).
24. The Supreme Court stated:
The Solicitor General's policy for determining when to appeal an adverse deci-
sion would also require substantial revision.... The application of nonmutual estop-
pel against the Government would force the Solicitor General... to appeal every
adverse decision in order to avoid foreclosing further review.
Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160-61 (footnotes omitted).
25. Id. at 163.
26. Id. at 160, 163.
27. This plainly was the prevailing assumption prior to the Ninth Circuit's contrary deci-
sion in Mendoza, 672 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1983), the decision ultimately reversed by the
Supreme Court in Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 155. There had been isolated suggestions that such
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preserved that assumption, relieving the federal government of the threat
that an unappealed adverse decision would acquire issue-preclusive ef-
fect. It thereby removed an incentive uncritically to seek further review
of adverse decisions of the lower federal courts. But the Court's prefer-
ence for the existing regime would be justifiable only if lawyers represent-
ing the United States act in a manner that makes it possible to realize the
advantages of "percolation" and sparing resort to appeal.
The Court understood as much. It responded with a roundly posi-
tive assessment of the role played by the Solicitor General in governing
the flow of appellate litigation in government cases throughout the fed-
eral judicial system. Citing the government's own brief as the only perti-
nent authority, Justice Rehnquist described the government's policy,
administered by the Solicitor General, of only selectively appealing from
adverse decisions of lower federal courts:
[T]he Government's litigation conduct in a case is apt to differ
from that of a private litigant. Unlike a private litigant who
generally does not forgo an appeal if he believes that he can
prevail, the Solicitor General considers a variety of factors,
such as the limited resources of the Government and the
crowded dockets of the courts, before authorizing an appeal.28
And the Court was plainly appreciative of the assistance rendered by the
Solicitor General in screening its docket according to the traditional cri-
teria for "certworthiness.
' ' 29
In short, the first ground for the result in Mendoza was this: the
relitigation should not be permitted. See, e.g., Goodman's Furniture Co. v. United States Pos-
tal Serv., 561 F.2d 462, 463 (3d Cir. 1977); id. at 465 (Weis, J., concurring); May Dep't Stores
Co. v. Williamson, 549 F.2d 1147, 1149 (8th Cir. 1977) (Lay, J., concurring). Such sugges-
tions were also heard from the ranks of legal scholars. See Vestal, Relitigation by Federal
Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and Synthesis of Judicial Policies, 55 N.C.L. REv. 123 (1977).
They were at least implied in muted fashion by a governmental commission considering the
workload of the federal court system. See COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT
APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGE (1975) A-135-36, A-158, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 349, 360-61 (1975). Yet these
were no more than stray protests against the established practice.
The government's brief in Mendoza makes clear that the Solicitor General's Office had
been operating under the assumption that its decision not to appeal an adverse decision,
thereby allowing the judgment to become final, would not preclude relitigation of the same
issue in other cases involving other parties. Brief for the United States, supra note 20, at 30-31,
33-34. The opinion of the Court accepts this assertion. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160-61.
28. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161 (citing Brief for the United States at 30-31, United States v.
Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (No. 82-849)).
29. See id. at 163. In describing Mendoza, Professor Strauss has commented that "the
Court would certainly have been aware how responsive the executive branch had been, in
exercising [control over the filing of certiorari petitions], to the Court's own limitations."
Strauss, supra note 22, at 1109.
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Court was persuaded that the existing system, in which the Solicitor
General selectively scrutinizes candidates for appeal and certiorari,
resorting to further review in sparing fashion, and is mindful of the spe-
cial needs of the Supreme Court to regulate its docket, is more efficient
and conducive to better decisions than the alternative model portended
by applying nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government. We
should pause to take note of just how extraordinary this conclusion is.
The Court concluded that across-the-board application of nonmutual
collateral estoppel against the United States on questions of law would be
undesirable. But it also recognized that any selective application of non-
mutual collateral estoppel would be unworkable because it would then be
uncertain, when the time came for taking an appeal in the first case de-
cided adversely to the government on a given legal issue, whether that
decision would subsequently be given collateral estoppel effect.30 The
Court thus concluded that the Solicitor General does a better job of gov-
erning the flow of government appellate litigation, including relitigation,
than any doctrine that the courts could devise and administer them-
selves. Accordingly, the Court exempted the United States from the ap-
plication of nonmutual collateral estoppel on questions of law, in effect
delegating to the Solicitor General the responsibility to act in a manner
that protects judicial economy values and fosters the smooth develop-
ment of the law. Implicit in the Court's rationale there necessarily lies a
blueprint for the conduct by the Solicitor General of his Office. Before
moving on to the second, more political, line of reasoning offered by the
Mendoza Court in support of its ruling, I will explore the implications of
this initial judicial-management based rationale for the question of the
independence of the Solicitor General. What traits then does this initial
rationale require of the Solicitor General if he or she is to repay the confi-
dence reflected in the Court's assessment in Mendoza? How may these
traits be realized in the operations of the Solicitor General's Office?
B. The Implications of the Judicial Administration Rationale
The pragmatic rationale voiced by the Court in United States v.
Mendoza" requires that the Solicitor General acquire and consistently
apply a special expertise, and a high level of self-restraint, in gauging
adverse decisions and determining their suitability as candidates for ap-
peal. There are several distinct but intertwined facets to this unique role.
The first is a highly refined ability to assess the prospects for success
30. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162.
31. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
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on the merits of a particular case, as a matter of pure doctrinal sound-
ness. In Mendoza, the Court distinguished the Solicitor General from
private litigants and their counsel by highlighting the government's unu-
sual willingness to forego appeal in cases in which it believes it might
prevail.32 Closely intertwined with that behavior, however, is the Solici-
tor General's cultivation of a realistic sense of the likelihood of success in
the cases submitted for authorization for appeal. This realistic vision is a
key basis of the restraint displayed by the Solicitor General in authoriz-
ing appeal and the filing of petitions for a writ of certiorari. While the
Solicitor General's skill as a prognosticator is thus an important qualifi-
cation, the precise attribute I have in mind here is something different
than pure predictive ability regarding what the courts would decide in a
given case. Perhaps it is best described as the faculty for determining
whether the government ought to prevail in a particular case given a
correct application of existing relevant sources of law.33 This faculty is
aptly described as quasi-judicial. In performing this function the Solici-
tor General plays the role of a judge, assessing the merits of the case.
While the Solicitor General may at times take up a case that he or she
personally adjudges nonmeritorious, and, more often, one unsupported
by existing law, this analytic process is still a vital force for self-restraint
in the flow of government litigation. The presumptive rule applied by the
Solicitor General's staff is: if we cannot persuade ourselves that the gov-
ernment ought to prevail in the case, the case does not warrant the atten-
tion of the courts. To undertake this analysis and apply this rule of
conduct, the Solicitor General needs both a discerning understanding of
the applicable precedents, statutes and other sources of law, and a degree
of detachment from the adversarial perspective.
The first of these objectives is pursued through familiar expedients.
Staff lawyers, known as Assistants to the Solicitor General, numbering
about fifteen at any given time in recent years, are hired on the strength
of conventional criteria. These include strong law school records, often
followed by competitive clerkships with noted judges, usually followed
by a few years in a high-powered law firm, or less commonly by effective
service as a lawyer elsewhere in the government. Most of the Assistants
to the Solicitor General do not plan a career of service in the Office.
They average three years or so in the position. Nevertheless, political
views or affiliations traditionally have not been a criteria for hiring. Res-
32. Id. at 161; see supra text accompanying note 28.
33. Other skills that contribute to the predictive ability of the Solicitor General, in addi-
tion to this one, are addressed separately in the ensuing discussion. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 38-44.
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ignations are not submitted upon a change of administrations. More-
over, many of the Deputy Solicitors General-the intermediate position
between the Solicitor General and the assistants-have been hired from
among the rank of the seasoned assistants. At this level, too, tradition
dictates that service is not dependent on party affiliation and does not
end upon a change of administrations. Indeed, the longer tenure of dep-
uties is a critical means for maintaining institutional memory and con-
tinuity of policy when a presidential election brings a new Solicitor
General into office.
This selection process is followed by a form of in-house continuing
education. This educational process is built into the flow of the work
itself through the Office hierarchy. The operation of this process of re-
view differs in the context of appeal and certiorari screening from that
employed in Supreme Court brief-writing. In the screening process each
lawyer in the office studies the written recommendations received from
the affected government agency and the lawyers who handled the case
prior to the adverse decision. He or she adds his or her recommenda-
tions in written form to those received. A tradition of individual rather
than collective responsibility applies to the memorandum prepared by
the assistant. Although the assistant's memorandum will not constitute
the final word on the matter, it reflects the assistant's final judgment.
Thus, when one of the Deputy Solicitors General in turn receives the file,
he or she will record his or her own written views, adding them to the
file, but not editing or revising the recommendation of the assistant. The
written and oral comments of the Deputy Solicitors General regarding
cases within their jurisdiction constitute a key device for preserving and
propagating the standards, values and assessment techniques of an Office
whose staff turns over relatively rapidly.
More than these qualities of intellect and insight is required to be
able to determine whether or not the government ought to prevail on an
appeal of a particular adverse decision under prevailing precedents and
authorities. The Solicitor General must, in addition, repress the familiar
instinctive reaction of the losing advocate: "I was robbed." The need to
do this provides a significant justification for the relatively unusual divi-
sion of labor in control and conduct of federal government litigation that
is reflected both in the Solicitor General's Office and more generally in
the Department of Justice. As I noted at the outset of this Article, not
only is all of the government's Supreme Court litigation performed by a
specialized team of lawyers that has no hand in litigation in lower courts,
but the government also separates the responsibility for authorizing ap-
peals from adverse decisions of federal district courts to the courts of
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appeals from the actual conduct of those appeals.3 4
The staffing pattern employed within the Solicitor General's Office
also fosters this kind of detachment. The authority of the Solicitor Gen-
eral necessarily spans the entire spectrum of federal government litiga-
tion. Specialization and expertise in the Office are concentrated at its
middle tier: the entire field of federal government litigation is parcelled
out among the four or five Deputy Solicitors General." By contrast, the
Assistants to the Solicitor General are consummate generalists.3 6 With
the exception of the individual working on federal tax matters, each as-
sistant works for each of the deputies, and therefore will be exposed over
time to the entire field of government litigation, both civil and criminal.
Moreover, hiring of assistants is generally carried out without seeking
34. See supra text accompanying note 1. In addition, each of the litigating divisions of the
Department of Justice maintains a separate appellate section or staff with responsibility for
conducting most, if not all of that division's in-house appellate litigation.
Much of the Department of Justice's litigation is executed outside of "Main Justice" by
the 94 United States Attorney's Offices. This is particularly true of criminal prosecution and
relatively unspecialized civil litigation. A substantial proportion of federal litigation is, in ad-
dition, carried out by agencies that have their own litigating authority in the lower federal
courts. See supra note 1. The use of specialized appellate staffs is apparently less characteristic
of litigation carried out under any of these auspices. Nevertheless, the value of this pattern is
not entirely unrecognized. Some of the United States Attorney's Offices maintain an appellate
staff or at least designate a chief of appeals. In the author's experience, the virtue of adopting
this approach was the subject of continuing proselytism by the Solicitor General's Office di-
rected at the United States Attorneys.
35. For instance, one of the deputies traditionally will be responsible for all criminal cases.
A second may be responsible for several more or less broad areas of civil litigation: for exam-
ple, labor law, antitrust, civil rights and federal taxation. A third may oversee litigation affect-
ing federal property and natural resources, environmental law, litigation affecting and
involving Native American Indians, and litigation within the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. A fourth may deal with the enormous and daunting category of all other
federal civil litigation.
These apportionments of jurisdiction are not fixed; they have been adjusted over time in
response to factors such as the differential growth in components of the federal caseload, the
available expertise of the persons appointed to the position of deputy, and the number of depu-
ties appointed at any given time. In The Tenth Justice, Caplan charges that in the Reagan
Administration political considerations have resulted in reassignment of a deputy's jurisdiction
deemed politically sensitive or central to some aspect of the Reagan social agenda. For exam-
ple, jurisdiction was reassigned from one long-term career deputy, Lawrence Wallace, who was
deemed politically unreliable or unsympathetic. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 60-61. During
the Reagan Administration, the position of Counselor to the Solicitor General was invented to
provide a position for a politically reliable second-in cdmmand. Ii at 62. Previously, the only
provision made for such a hierarchy within the Office, was the informal recognition, on the
basis of seniority as deputy, of a "first deputy," who would act in the Solicitor General's stead
when the Solicitor General was disqualified in a particular matter because of a conflict of
interest, or was otherwise temporarily unavailable.
36. Lawyers serving elsewhere in the government whose recommendations are frequently
rejected by the Solicitor General might label them "dilettantes."
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established expertise in particular areas of government litigation. On the
other hand, a kind of informal subspecialization is fostered among assist-
ants once they arrive in the Office. Within each deputy's jurisdiction, a
newly received matter often will be assigned to an attorney who has pre-
viously worked on a problem within the same narrow subspecialty-if
there is one. Each assistant develops, during his or her tenure in the
Office, an array of such subspecialties, but these are rarely allowed to
coalesce into a conventional form of subject matter specialization of prac-
tice. 37 This system captures some of the advantages of expertise and spe-
cialization. But its primary effect, if not its conscious purpose, is to
insulate the staff attorney responsible for handling a case from the needs,
objectives and passions of the agency or governmental unit directl' in-
volved in the case, as well as the perspectives of the government's liti-
gators in the lower courts.
Along with this quasi-judicial perspective, other traits are required
of a Solicitor General fulfilling the screening function envisioned for the
Office by the Supreme Court in Mendoza. In addition, the role requires
the exercise of sound judgment as to the attractiveness of a potential ve-
hicle for appeal-will the government's position seem particularly palat-
able on the facts and circumstances of a given case or will the
government's position smack of overreaching or cleverness in the pursuit
of injustice?
At first it might seem that this requirement responds only to the
partisan interests of the government in winning cases and establishing
favorable precedent, and has nothing to do with the judicial management
objectives reflected in the Mendoza rule. Such a perception would be
only partially accurate. It is widely believed by lawyers in the Solicitor
General's Office that the art of selecting an appropriate "vehicle" for es-
tablishing a point the government wishes to make is of critical impor-
tance. Through the operation of the Solicitor General's Office, the
government is able, to a degree unique among litigants, to coordinate its
37. Within each deputy's jurisdiction an assistant will have a number of areas of recog-
nized expertise. Two assistants may share a subspecialty. Closely related subspecialties are
frequently separated. For instance, during my tenure as an assistant, one assistant handled
most of'the cases arising under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982), while a
different assistant handled matters that arose under the speedy trial clause of the sixth amend-
ment, U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, cl. 1.
Another factor that militates against the development of any true pattern of specialization
is the relatively rapid turnover of assistants within the Office. Although there are, at any given
time, a handful of lawyers interested in making a career in the Solicitor General's Office, it is
but a waystation for the majority, who typically stay about three years before moving on.
Another factor discouraging specialization is that many cases that come to the Office will not
fit into a particular established subspecialty.
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litigation and to choose and groom favorable test cases on important is-
sues of law. This ability plainly contributes to the long range success of
the government's litigation program both in the Supreme Court and in
the courts of appeals.
So it is plain that the government does not engage in this aspect of
its screening activities out of a disinterested concern for efficient judicial
management.38  At the same time, the two are not entirely unrelated. If
one accepts Justice Holmes' notion that "hard cases" at least sometimes
make "bad law,' 39 the connection becomes apparent-although it is bi-
valent. By careful selection of attractive "test cases" as vehicles for fur-
ther review, the Solicitor General's screening tends to avoid or at least to
reduce the judicial temptation to reach a result that seems appealing on
the facts of a particular case, but which depends on a doctrine that would
not or should not be embraced in light of the general complexion of the
problems to which it would apply. In addition, if hard cases are not
representative they simply are not an efficient use of the limited resources
of the judicial system, especially at the Supreme Court level. Thus, by
screening out cases that are "hard" from the government's perspective,
the Solicitor General tends to forestall production of law that is either
"bad," or that provides inadequate or misleading guidance to the lower
courts.
At the same time, of course, the government's screening is likely at
38. The same point could be made concerning the Solicitor General's pursuit of detached,
quasi-judicial expertise in assessing cases on the merits. The government has self-interested
reasons for doing this, too. First, litigating cases that cannot and should not be won is rarely
of any benefit to the government. Second, because the docket of the Supreme Court-and the
appetite of the courts of appeals for rehearing en banc-is strictly limited, the Solicitor Gen-
eral must view every candidate for authorization for further review as vying with each of the
govermnent's other cases for a spot on the; docket. This is especially so given the very large
proportion of the Supreme Court's docket that is occupied by government cases. See infra
note 46. Third, the Solicitor General builds up a fund of credibility, at least in the Supreme
Court, which is aware of the Office's screening function, by consistently refusing to pursue
nonmeritorious appeals. This may enhance the government's prospects on the cases that the
Solicitor General deems meritorious. Conversely, while the reputation for strict screening will
survive an occasional misjudgment, or even an isolated politically motivated pursuit of an
untenable position, see infra text accompanying notes 50-53, such conduct becomes self-defeat-
ing if it is too regular.
The fact that the Solicitor General's litigating conduct serves the litigating interests of the
United States does not contradict the Court's observation that it serves the interests of judicial
management. Indeed, the real force of the Court's point is that the Solicitor General's pursuit
of the government's "selfish" interests will typically cause him or her to act in a manner that
serves the ends ofjudicial management and the development of the law. Because of this coinci-
dence of self-interest and regard for judicial management interests, reliance on the conduct of
the Solicitor General may be warranted.
39. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) ("Great cases like hard cases make bad law.").
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times to bring forward cases that are "easy" from the government's point
of view. Moreover, there is no one-outside the Court itself-in a van-
tage point to exercise a countervailing influence.' As Justice Thurgood
Marshall has pointed out, easy cases may be equally conducive to the
rendition of "bad" law." That the Solicitor General's screening is, in
this respect, a two-edged sword does not mean that it is undesirable. The
Court itself should be expected to be attentive to the skewing effects of
the Solicitor General's screening, both when it considers whether a par-
ticular case should be granted review and in considering the merits.
Moreover, while the Solicitor General can be expected to select "vehi-
cles" that make possible presentation of the government's contentions in
a favorable light, where possible, he or she must also be able to persuade
the Court that a given case presents a sufficiently typical exemplar of an
unresolved problem in the law that it warrants the Court's consideration.
Thus, some built-in inhibitions exist in the screening process that limit
excessive pursuit of partisan advantage.
The Court's consideration of the merits also inhibits the Solicitor
General's case-selection conduct. What if the Solicitor General has se-
cured review of an adverse decision below that presents atypical facts
that make it a misleading vehicle for deciding some more general point of
law? In many such cases the circumstances that make such a case unrep-
40. No party occupies a position to screen all of the cases put before the courts by the
government from this point of view. In certain discrete areas of the law some of the Solicitor
General's activities have been emulated, as for instance, by the State and Local Legal Center of
the Academy for State and Local Government, which files amicus briefs in the Supreme Court
of the United States in civil cases affecting the collective interests of the states. See Solomon,
Federalism-Making the Case for State and Local Governments, 18 URD. LAW. 483 (1986).
Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union also play a somewhat similar role in moni-
toring the caseload of the Supreme Court with an eye toward protecting the interests promoted
by their organizations. But these efforts necessarily lack the impact on the Supreme Court's
docket that the Solicitor General achieves. Not only do these organizations lack the stature
traditionally enjoyed in the eyes of the Court by the Solicitor General, they lack the resources
and interest comprehensively to survey the cases put forward by the government. In any
event, the screening function is most effectively played by a party, such as the United States,
which is in a position either to seek or decline further review of adverse decisions or to oppose
or acquiesce in the certiorari petitions filed by opposing counsel in cases the government has
won below. Thus, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the government's screening imparts a
favorable cast to the Supreme Court's docket that is not counterbalanced by any equal and
opposite factor.
41. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 840 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) ("Easy cases at times produce bad law ...."). Justice Marshall's explanation for his
dictum mirrors Justice Holmes' more familiar proposition. In "easy" cases, Justice Marshall
observed, courts may "in the rush to reach a clearly ordained result," offer up "principles,
doctrines, and statements that calmer reflection, and a fuller understanding of their implica-
tions in concrete settings, would eschew." Id.; cf Northern Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 400-01
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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resentative should be apparent to an able Supreme Court advocate and
thus can be pointed out.42 In others, these circumstances should be ap-
parent to the Court itself. Finally, cases exist in which governmental
officials are uniquely in a position to assess the representative character
of the fact pattern of a particular case. It appears that the Court gives
very substantial credence to the representations of the Solicitor General
in a certiorari petition concerning the practical impact of decisions
sought to be reviewed. This no doubt carries over to the consideration of
the merits. As explained below,43 a special obligation of trust is imposed
on the Solicitor General by the Supreme Court's reliance on the candor
and even-handedness of the Solicitor General's representations to the
Court. The ultimate sanction that enforces this obligation of trust is the
implicit threat that reliance will not continue when reliability ceases.
The Solicitor General need not discharge this portion of his or her role in
a perfectly even-handed manner to make this portion of the screening
role worthwhile. So long as the Solicitor General contributes, on bal-
ance, to the intelligent selection of cases for further review, the function
performed will be beneficial.
In addition to the ability to perceive what the courts ought to do in
light of the applicable law, and the ability to assess the attractiveness of a
particular case as a vehicle for achieving that result, the Solicitor General
should possess insight concerning the direction and pace of doctrinal de-
velopment in the many fields of government litigation. Particularly when
clarification or alteration of existing doctrine is sought from the courts,
especially the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General must gauge the read-
iness of the courts to consider the particular problem, and their recep-
tiveness, in light of cases that have come before and any indicia that
reconsideration may be warranted, to the position the government pro-
poses to put forward.' This perspective on the state of the law is also
42. It is a familiar observation that too few of the lawyers who practice before the Court
possess the ability we might expect to find in them. See, eg., Burger, Conference on Supreme
Court Advocacy, 33 CATH. U.L. Rnv. 525 (1984). Plainly, the bar as a whole and clients
insufficiently appreciate the advantages of retaining a skilled practitioner with substantial
Supreme Court litigation experience for the purpose of representing private litigants before the
Court. Separate and apart from the benefit that accrues to the client out of securing such
representation, we should recognize that there is a public interest served by such representa-
tion. Both at the certiorari stage and during consideration of a case on the merits, such coun-
sel are better able to counterbalance any skewing that may be imparted by the efforts of the
Solicitor General.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 55-56.
44. This imperative may at times conflict with other criteria for the conduct of the Solici-
tor General, with the result that commentators may express criticism of the Solicitor General's
performance. A nice illustration is suggested by the well-known commentary of then-Profes-
sor (now Justice) Scalia on the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
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required when the Solicitor General invokes Supreme Court supervision
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Scalia, Vermont Yankee:
The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Cr. REv. 345. In Vermont
Yankee the Supreme Court held that the federal courts have no authority to impose extra-
statutory procedural requirements on federal agencies engaged in rulemaking. 435 U.S. at
543-46. The Supreme Court utilized its decision in Vermont Yankee as the occasion to deliver
a severe tongue-lashing to the D.C. Circuit which had rendered the decision below, Natural
Resources Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), and which had, over the course of several years, been pressing federal administra-
tive agencies engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking to utilize more formal procedures
than those required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
The occasion chosen for this reprimand was less than perfect. The problem was that it
was hardly clear that the D.C. Circuit was, on this occasion, guilty as charged. The opinion of
the court of appeals setting aside agency action in the particular case could be understood to
rest either on the inadequacy of the record to support the agency's conclusions, or on the
inadequacy of the statutorily-prescribed procedures as a means of determining the particular
issues before the agency. See Vermont Yankee, 547 F.2d at 653-54. As Scalia acknowledged,
"[t]he essential meaning of the opinion below was" on this score simply "unclear." Scalia,
supra, at 356. Indeed, he conceded that the court of appeals' offending doctrine was either
"dictum" or at most an "alternative holding." Id. Even the Supreme Court confessed diffi-
culty in discerning whether the court of appeals had imposed any additional procedures on the
agency. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 539-42. While the Court ultimately concluded that the
lower court had imposed additional procedures, it acknowledged, in closing, that this might
have been an alternative basis for the judgment. Id. at 549.
When Vermont Yankee came before the Court on the petition for a writ of certiorari filed
by the private party supporting the agency decision, the Solicitor General opposed certiorari,
acting just as the pragmatic rationale dictates that he should. The brief in opposition filed by
the Solicitor General urged: (1) that the court of appeals' decision could be based on the
uncontroversial ground that the record lacked support for the agency's conclusions; (2) that
the court of appeals' discussion of extra-statutory procedural obligations was "simply dictum";
and (3) that any question concerning such procedural requirements was not ripe for review.
Brief for the Federal Respondents (On Petitions for Writs of Certiorari) at 9-10, Vermont
Yankee, 435 U.S. 519. The contrary view of the agency directly involved in the case, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, was presented in the brief submitted by the Solicitor Gen-
eral, but was rejected by him.
In his commentary, Scalia critized the Solicitor General's position. Scalia argued that the
D.C. Circuit had produced a series of decisions endorsing the use of "hybrid rulemaking"
procedures more elaborate than those prescribed by the APA. He also argued that the D.C.
Circuit had deliberately insulated this line of cases from Supreme Court review by an artful use
of a "pattern of dicta, alternate holdings, and confused holdings." Scalia, supra, at 372. Scalia
faulted the Solicitor General's Office for failing to see the compelling need for Supreme Court
review of this line of authority and for failing to recognize that, because of the court of appeals'
skillful artifice, no better candidate for that review, under the conventionally applied criteria,
was likely to emerge. He stated:
While the D.C. Circuit could profit from more attention to the art of being an infer-
ior court, perhaps the Solicitor General's Office could do with a bit more attention to
reality. There was probably no single controverted issue of administrative law as
important-and as needful of early Supreme Court resolution-as the D.C. Circuit's
approach to the APA, clearly exemplified in its Vermont Yankee opinion. Under the
circumstances, the clouded question whether the actual holding turned on that issue
was a relative detail.
Ia at 373-74. Scalia was quick to perceive that what he considered the Solicitor General's
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over errant lower courts. Here, despite occasional lapses,4" the Solicitor
General's vantage point atop the pyramid of federal litigation affords an
unparalleled opportunity to acquire and apply this perspective. The bal-
ance provided by the leavening of the relatively expert submissions of the
agency client and the lawyers who have handled a matter in the lower
courts with the generalist perspective of the Assistant to the Solicitor
General may be useful in this regard. This is particularly true when
these contrasting viewpoints are then submitted for the consideration of a
seasoned Deputy Solicitor General who has had the opportunity to de-
velop a magisterial perspective concerning the long term development of
the law in his or her area of jurisdiction.
Another trait that is necessary to realize the promise of Mendoza's
pragmatic rationale is the Solicitor General's familiarity with the condi-
tion of the courts' dockets, and the criteria used by the courts for manag-
ing those dockets. This is particularly true at the Supreme Court level:
the Solicitor General must be able to anticipate which cases will be
deemed to meet the Court's standards for certiorari review. It appears
that the Solicitor General has been highly successful in this respect in
recent years.46 Moreover, the Solicitor General must internalize these
obtuseness in this instance sprung directly from the Solicitor General's performance of his
usual role. He continued:
The Solicitor General's Office prides itself, and rightly so, upon fastidious attention
to the technical aspects of the lawyer's craft; and surely that includes appreciation of
the distinction between holding and dictum, and precise identification of the basis for
a decision. One wonders, however, whether in the age of the legislative opinion,
intentionally designed to say and to impose much more than it holds, a somewhat
lesser attention to those factors in selecting cases for certiorari might not be justi-
fied.... One can only hope for an elevation of the standards of practice of the D.C.
Circuit, and perhaps a lowering of standards by the Solicitor General to meet them
halfway.
Id. at 374-75.
45. See supra note 44.
46. Statistics reproduced by Caplan in The Tenth Justice support this conclusion. For
instance, in one recent term the Supreme Court granted 79% of the petitions for a writ of
certiorari filed by the Solicitor General while it granted only 3% of all petitions filed in that
year. Only 2% of nongovernment petitions were granted without the support of the Solicitor
General. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 4. These figures appear to be representative. See R.
STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 190, 192 (6th ed. 1986).
Cases heard on the federal government's petition make up about one-fourth of the Court's
docket in most years. Id. at 192.
These statistics need not be accepted uncritically as proving the point asserted. Plainly
the Solicitor General's success rate is attributable to several different factors. First, the Solici-
tor General's Office has acquired, through its specialization and institutional memory, a partic-
ularly good sense of what the Supreme Court considers "certworthy." In addition, this high
success rate undoubtedly reflects success in performing other aspects of the Solicitor General's
role discussed in the text above: dispassionate assessment of the doctrinal merits of the cases in
which-adverse decisions have been rendered; sensitive appreciation of the visceral appeal or
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criteria and identify with them, so that he or she can and will apply them
to screen adverse decisions recommended for appeal by the affected
agency clients and the federal government lawyers who have litigated
them in the lower courts. It is not enough that the Solicitor General
understand the factors that motivate the exercise of the Supreme Court's
certiorari jurisdiction, so as to be able to identify the stronger and weaker
certiorari candidates. The Solicitor General must in practice assume the
primary responsibility for winnowing the large number of adverse deci-
sions of the courts of appeals in government cases to a volume that fits
within the very limited docket of the Supreme Court.47 In short, the
Solicitor General must seek to impose these standards on the copious
flow of government cases that are candidates for appeal so as to maintain
both the reality and the appearance of selectivity in governing the flow of
government appeals.48
lack thereof of particular cases as vehicles for developing the law; and an acute feeling for the
merging direction of doctrinal growth or change. Moreover, none of these cognitive attributes
could account for the Solicitor General's success rate in securing Supreme Court review were it
not for the Office's ability to be fairly selective in seeking further review in the Supreme Court,
enforcing upon losing federal government litigants the traditional criteria for granting certio-
rari. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53.
In addition to these factors, the Solicitor General's success likely reflects a general reserve
of credibility earned from the Court over the years. Even when the usual criteria for certiorari
review are not met, or where the significance of the issue is not apparent to the nongovernment
observer, the Court has been unusually willing to accept the Solicitor General's assertions
concerning the importance of the issue presented. See infra text accompanying notes 54-56.
47. It is instructive to compare the high proportion of government certiorari petitions that
are granted, see supra note 46, with the low proportion of cases tendered to the Solicitor Gen-
eral for certiorari consideration in which a petition is actually filed, see infra note 48. Plainly
the Solicitor General, rather than the Court, does the bulk of the screening work in govern-
ment cases.
48. Statistics contained in the Solicitor General's brief in Mendoza provide some support
for a conclusion that the Solicitor General has succeeded in maintaining the desired selective
appeal policy. According to these statistics kept by the Office of the Solicitor General, in 1982
the Solicitor General authorized appeal from an adverse district court judgment in slightly
more than half (621 out of 1118) of the cases submitted for consideration. In that same year,
the Solicitor General approved the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court in only about 11% (64 out of 579) of the cases in which formal consideration was given
to seeking such review. Brief for the United States, supra note 20, at 30-31 n.24.
These statistics do not indicate the proportion of these cases in which other government
agencies or other components of the Department of Justice had themselves recommended
against seeking further review. In the author's own experience, this occurred quite often.
Thus, these statistics arguably overstate the Solicitor General's selectivity in some respects.
But it is also true that a decision sometimes is made not to seek the Solicitor General's authori-
zation of an appeal of an adverse decision. This practice conflicts with the regulations defining
the Solicitor General's authority, but it is sometimes tolerated under customs or understand-
ings that have evolved between other government components and the Office of the Solicitor
General. As a result, these statistics may understate the selectivity of the process as a whole.
In any event, it is the selectivity of the process as a whole that matters. Government agencies
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One other attribute must be added to this developing picture. The
Solicitor General must enjoy sufficient stature and authority within the
Department of Justice and the executive branch as a whole so that he or
she can routinely and continually make numerous decisions against seek-
ing further review, in the face of contrary recommendations from else-
where in the government. (The statistics in the margin bear witness to
the regularity with which this does and must occur.)49 Moreover, these
decisions by the Solicitor General must not be reversed-at least not with
any frequency-by the Attorney General, under whose authority the So-
licitor General acts." And the Solicitor General's decisions also must be
insulated from any regular interference emanating from the President's
staff in the White House. Unless these last requirements are met, none of
the attributes described above will ensure the success of the Solicitor
General in playing the role scripted for him by the Court in Mendoza.
As a practical matter then, the decisions of the Solicitor General must
almost always constitute the last word within the federal government as
to whether further review will be sought of an adverse decision.
Why is this kind of finality necessary to secure the objectives en-
dorsed by the Court in Mendoza? This brings us directly to the question
of the independence of the Solicitor General. Why cannot control over
the flow of government litigation be decentralized-that is, placed in the
hands of the agencies affected or the lawyers in the Department of Justice
responsible for litigation in the lower courts? Alternatively, why cannot
the performance of this task be subjected to oversight at the highest polit-
ical levels of the executive branch without losing the guiding attitudes
explored above?
and litigating divisions of the Department of Justice sometimes recommend against seeking
further review of an adverse decision because those who would prefer to recommend appeal or
filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari simply do not believe the case would pass the Solicitor
General's scrutiny. Sometimes a recommendation against further review is made because
those involved have internalized the Solicitor General's criteria for seeking such review. In
either event, a selective policy of appeal has effectively been instituted under which only rela-
tively meritorious cases are pursued on appeal.
49. See supra notes 46-48.
50. See 1977 Memorandum, supra note 1, at 234, reprinted in 21 LOY. L.A.L. REv. 1089,
1096 (1988). In addition, the Solicitor General's authority and influence must be sufficient to
encourage client government agencies and lawyers elsewhere in the Justice Department to
internalize the standards applied by the Solicitor General. To the extent this is done, the
Solicitor General's authority is not gratuitously sapped by repeated contests to uphold his or
her judgment against the contrary recommendations of lawyers elsewhere in the government.
See supra note 48. Even when the recommendations received by the Solicitor General favor
further review, the expenditure of political capital entailed by the rejection of these recommen-
dations is much less when agencies both understand the grounds for rejection and appreciate
that appeal will almost always be futile.
1139
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1119
With respect to the agencies and the other litigating arms of the
Department of Justice, the answer rests on the leverage that centraliza-
tion and expertise give to the Solicitor General. It would be very difficult
indeed to try to replicate in a host of separate government offices the
attitudes of detachment, rigor, and candor, and the feel for the desirabil-
ity of a case as a vehicle and for the emerging direction of the law, that
are desired attributes for a Solicitor General. Much more difficult still,
however, would be to make agency lawyers and officials or other govern-
ment litigators play the role of gatekeepers for the courts in the manner
that role is played by the Solicitor General. Others obviously can be
made to understand, in abstract terms, the need for selectivity in gov-
erning the flow of government appellate litigation. But only one who has
oversight over the full spectrum of government appeals can be expected
to rigorously enforce the appropriate criteria. What distinguishes the So-
licitor General from private counsel, in the final analysis, when it comes
to decisions as to whether to appeal or seek certiorari, is that private
counsel and their clients ordinarily have little to lose-other than the
expense of what may well be a futile legal effort-by seeking further re-
view. By contrast, for the government, each certiorari petition author-
ized competes with every other government case for a spot on the Court's
small and essentially fixed docket.51 If authority over government litiga-
tion is dispersed among several or many decision-makers, each will be
subject to the same dilemma as private counsel. Each one, lacking any
assurance that restraint can be enforced on the others, will have an incen-
tive to act without restraint.52 Thus, only an officer with the centralized
authority enjoyed by the Solicitor General can acquire and enforce the
desired attitudes regarding the flow of government appellate litigation.
Accordingly, the authority of the Solicitor General to override the rec-
51. This is true to a lesser extent at the appeals authorization level. The courts of appeals
generally are not courts of discretionary jurisdiction. Thus, the Solicitor General is not under
as much pressure to apply as rigorous standards in governing the taking of appeals as he is at
the Supreme Court level. It is true that the Solicitor General is supposed to consider the
aggregate limitations on judicial resources at this level in screening potential appeals. See
Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161. Still, because these resources, unlike those of the Supreme Court,
are not rigidly fixed, the screening process is less stringent at this level. As a result, the desire
to maintain the credibility of the government as a litigant is probably of greater significance
than docket limitations in enforcing selectivity upon the Solicitor General in the appeals au-
thorization process. This factor, too, is diluted at the appeals authorization level, because of
the absence of any direct, much less ongoing, relationship between the Solicitor General and
the courts of appeals.
52. The dynamics of this situation parallel those of the classic game theory problem
known as the Prisoner's Dilemma. See R. LUCE & H. RAIrPA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-
102 (1967); see also M. OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 9-16 (rev. ed. 1971);
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243-48 (1968).
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ommendations of the many agencies and litigation groups within the gov-
ernment must be established.
What about the authority of the Attorney General and the Presi-
dent? It might in theory be possible to inculcate in the Attorney Gen-
eral, or even in the President and his or her staff, the attitudes that ought
to guide the conduct of government appellate litigation. The adverse
consequences of fragmentation of authority that militate against agency
control of Supreme Court litigation do not provide an objection in this
context. But the practical objection from the point of view of the Men-
doza Court to regular oversight of government appeals at this level of the
executive branch is a similar one. The Solicitor General specializes in
conducting federal Supreme Court litigation and governing the taking of
federal government appeals. This specialization naturally fosters the de-
velopment and internalization of the attitudes and special expertise that
have been explored above. Particularly important in this connection is
the rather intimate relationship between the Solicitor General and the
Supreme Court. Not only does the Court depend on the Solicitor Gen-
eral to serve as the primary mechanism for the regulation of its docket,
but the Court perceives that it and the Solicitor General share a long
term community of interest. The Court knows the character of the Solic-
itor General's advocacy as well as the reliability of his or her screening.
Inevitably, the Attorney General and the President will lack this intimate
relationship. Accordingly, they will also lack the resulting strong sense
of, and commitment to enforcing, the applicable screening criteria, stan-
dards of advocacy and docket limitations. In addition, because of the
tradition that the Attorney General serve as a key political adviser to the
President, it will be especially difficult for these officers to fulfill the
quasi-judicial aspects of the role demanded by the Court of the Solicitor
General.53 In consequence, if the government is to regulate its own ap-
pellate litigation in the manner posited by the Mendoza Court, responsi-
bility for doing so must be vested in a Solicitor General enjoying
sufficient independence to operate in the mode described above.
The limitations of this argument should also be made explicit. First,
it provides no reason for concluding that the Attorney General or the
President must never override a decision made by the Solicitor General.
An isolated decision made at these top political levels of the executive
branch will not destroy the operation of the system approved by the
Court in Mendoza. Even if a case not meeting the standards usually
53. The Office of Legal Counsel's Memorandum for Attorney General Bell emphasizes
this point. See 1977 Memorandum, supra note 1, at 232, reprinted in 21 Loy. L.A.L. REv.
1089, 1094 (1988).
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enforced for seeking further review is taken up as a result, the system
does not immediately break down. However, if the ability of the courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, to rely on the government's judgment in
identifying appropriate cases for its scarce docket is seriously compro-
mised, the result would be quite different. Furthermore, if the willing-
ness or ability of the government's attorneys to screen cases so as to fit
within the docket and resources of the judicial system is significantly un-
dercut, the current willingness of the courts to allow self-regulation by
the executive branch inevitably will change.
Second, this argument rests entirely on the needs of the courts, as
characterized in Mendoza, respecting the operations of the Solicitor Gen-
eral. This is a perspective based on judicial needs, or at least a judicial
perception of the public interest regarding the rules that govern the pro-
gress of cases through the courts. Of course it also contains an appeal to
the self-interest of the executive branch of government: if self-regulation
of government appeals in the mode envisioned by the Court breaks down,
alternatives that are less deferential to executive branch prerogatives may
take its place.
Third, this argument rests largely on the impact on the courts of one
aspect of the Solicitor General's work: the screening function, both at
the court of appeals level and especially at the stage of seeking certiorari
review in the Supreme Court of decisions of the courts of appeals adverse
to the United States. It does not focus on the Solicitor General's role in
litigating government cases in the Supreme Court once they have been
accepted for review. But this limitation does little to blunt the force of
the argument made respecting the overall conduct of the Solicitor Gen-
eral in relationship to the courts, the agencies and the Solicitor General's
executive branch superiors. The Solicitor General ordinarily cannot alter
the fundamental nature of his advocacy once cases are accepted for con-
sideration on the merits. Plainly there is more room for a more conven-
tional style of advocacy once this juncture is reached, but significant
restraints remain. Cases before the Court on the merits are generally
ones that have passed the screening process used by the Solicitor Gen-
eral, either in petitioning for certiorari or in framing the government's
response to petitions from opposing counsel in cases where the govern-
ment has won in the courts of appeals. Moreover, in the filings made at
the petition stage of the case, the Solicitor General casts the mold in
which his or her advocacy may operate. It would be embarassing, as well
as ineffective advocacy, to recharacterize the precedents, statutes or doc-
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trines that apply in a case once the certiorari petition has been granted.54
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the Solicitor General's advocacy on the
merits-as at the petition stage-depends upon the continued confidence
of the Court in the accuracy of the government's factual submissions and
the candor of the government's advocacy. For instance, the Supreme
Court's willingness to accept and to rely upon the extra-record factual
assertions of the government, particularly as to the policy implications of
the issues before the Court, is notorious among close observers of the
Court."5 The factual information involved frequently will not have been
assembled, or its relevance appreciated during litigation in the lower
courts. In addition, the kind of information involved is often not particu-
larly susceptible to rigorous proof in a traditional adjudicatory setting; it
often involves what Kenneth Culp Davis has called "legislative facts."56
Accordingly, it might be harsh to insist that the Court cannot have the
benefit of such information, which may well enhance its deliberations.
At the same time, the Court is plainly extending to the Solicitor General
a unique privilege that reflects a high degree of confidence in the Office's
reliability in such matters. In this context, as at the stage of screening
cases for hearing, a striking reciprocity of interest exists between the
Court and the Solicitor General. Reliability earns reliance. Reliance
promotes reliability.
Let me illustrate this special commonality of interest by making ref-
erence again to the litigation in Mendoza. I have already mentioned the
glowing portrayal of the conduct of the Solicitor General penned by Jus-
tice Rehnquist, which forms a linchpin of the Court's judicial administra-
tion rationale.5 7 Here too, the Court placed its reliance squarely on the
Solicitor General's own account of the process he administers and the
54. See Bob' Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). In this celebrated case the
Solicitor General switched sides on the key issue in the case following the granting of certio-
ran. The Court ultimately approved the position the Solicitor General had abandoned. See L.
CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 51-64.
55. The Solicitor General's practice of lodging with the Court documents that are not in
the record of the case is described by Caplan in The Tenth Justice. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2,
at 21-24. Government briefs routinely draw on factual assertions derived from private com-
munications to the Solicitor General by federal agencies concerned with the outcome of a case,
and the Supreme Court in turn routinely relies on the Solicitor General's report of these extra-
record, but often significant facts. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 90 n.1
(1976); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 847 n.4, 848 n.9 (1974); Federal Power
Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 350 n.4 (1974); Carleson v. Remillard, 406
U.S. 598, 602 (1972); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 604, 605-06 (1971); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 645 n.3 (1966); United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 347 (1966); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 91 (1958).
56. See K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 160 (1972).
57. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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standards employed in the process." What is most striking about this
reliance is not the fact that the Court was willing to accept this account,
the effect of which was pointedly self-serving-though I believe it to be
accurate, but the fact that reliance on this account was wholly unneces-
sary to achieve the result in the case. Such reliance was unnecessary
because another theory, one not dependent in any respect on the special
status of the Solicitor General, was available to the Court as a basis for
the decision.
There is a rather remarkable footnote in Justice Rehnquist's opinion
in Mendoza. Omitting only citations, the footnote in question reads in its
entirety:
The Government does not base its argument on the exception
to the doctrine of collateral estoppel for "unmixed questions of
law" arising in "successive actions involving unrelated subject
matter." Our holding in no way depends on that exception.5 9
The Court's reference is to what is sometimes known as the Moser doc-
trine.' ° Given the Court's statement that the case did not involve the
Moser doctrine, a reader who took the trouble to glance at the Brief for
the United States filed in Mendoza would be quite surprised at what she
would find. The lead argument made by the Solicitor General was not
one based on the special prerogatives that ought to be attached to gov-
ernment relitigation under his or her auspices. Instead it was an argu-
ment based squarely on the Moser doctrine that "Collateral Estoppel is
Inapplicable to an Unmixed Question of Law Arising upon the Succes-
sive Claims of Different Parties.1 61 The argument that the Court en-
dorsed in Mendoza, based on the special nature of government litigation,
was offered as a fall-back argument.62 Why did the government frame its
argument in this manner and why did the Court respond as it did? My
58. See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161 (citing Brief for the United States at 30-3 1, United States
v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (No. 82-849)).
59. Id. at 162-63 n.7 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162 (1979)).
60. The Court cites this doctrine to United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924)
(doctrine was articulated in dictum but found inapplicable); Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 162 (1979) ("Moser doctrine" was acknowledged but found inapplicable); and United
States v. Stauffer*Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1964) (companion case to Mendoza where Moser
doctrine was again found inapplicable and its very vitality questioned). See Mendoza, 464 U.S.
at 162-63 n.7.
61. Brief for the United States, supra note 20, at 20. See also id. at 17, 20-25.
62. See id. at 25-36. Moreover, the argument based on the special dynamics of federal
government litigation was introduced as a special corollary to the Moser doctrine, offered to
remove "any ambiguity in the application of the Moser exception to the issue preclusion doc-
trine." Id. at 25. Thus, the government's brief did not purport to frame the argument on
which the Court ultimately rested its decision as a wholly independent submission.
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recollection is that the government's brief led with the Moser doctrine
argument simply because the other argument partook too heavily of spe-
cial pleading. After all, it was an argument by the Solicitor General that
he should be accorded a special privilege not accorded any other litigant,
in large measure on the strength of the manner in which the Solicitor
General conducted his work. Accordingly, a decision was made that the
brief should attempt to resolve the issue on the basis of a principle that
made no distinction-at least no explicit distinction-between govern-
ment and non-government litigants: the Moser doctrine.63 The "special
pleading" argument was placed second in the brief.
The Court's opinion simply reverses the order of the arguments,
reaching only the special pleading argument. In fact, it seems to repre-
sent that the government had not made the Moser doctrine argument at
all."4 In a sense the ground on which the Court ruled is a "narrower
ground" than that offered by the Moser doctrine.65 Whatever embarrass-
ment the government felt about naked special pleading was not shared by
the Court. The Court was not hesitant, indeed it was eager, to expressly
exempt the Solicitor General from the rules applicable to private litigants
63. The effect of holding, as the government urged, that the Moser doctrine barred applica-
tion of collateral estoppel to recurring questions of law in the absence of mutuality would have
been to create an exception that primarily benefitted the government.
64. One could read the first sentence of Justice Rehnquist's footnote to mean only that the
argument raised by the government that the Court was treating in its opinion did not rest on
the Moser doctrine. But I would be very surprised if anyone who had not read the briefs in
Mendoza would so interpret it. This would especially be true of a reader interested in the
Moser doctrine who had read the companion decision to Mendoza, United States v. Stauffer
Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984), in which the Court found the Moser doctrine inapplicable and
questioned its continuing vitality.
My own view is that Justice Rehnquist used this misleading language in the footnote in an
effort to complete the interment of the Moser doctrine. Justice Rehnquist joined the Court's
opinion in Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), which markedly undercut the Moser
dictum, suggesting that its application would be very narrow. Id at 164. Justice Rehnquist
went to great lengths in Stauffer Chemical to question whether the doctrine retained any vital-
ity at all. See 464 U.S. at 170-73 & nn.3-5. But it was perfectly clear that if any exception to
issue preclusion were to be recognized for issues of law that recur in unrelated cases, such an
exception would apply afortiori when there was no mutuality of estoppel. Thus, if the Court
addressed the Moser doctrine in Mendoza, it would have been difficult to reject its application.
Moreover, if the Court had simply stated that it was pretermitting the Moser issue because
there was a narrower ground for decision, the deflating effect on the Moser doctrine would
have been somewhat less.
By ignoring the government's Moser doctrine argument, the Court avoided breathing any
life into that doctrine, but still was able to reach the desired result. Moreover, by ruling for the
government on the parochial ground chosen by the Court, the Court effectively ensured that
the government would have little interest in the future in attempting to pump life into Moser.
65. If this is all that the first sentence of Justice Rehnquist's footnote was intended to
communicate, the choice of wording could scarcely have been less felicitous. See supra note 64
for a more cynical interpretation of this aspect of the opinion in Mendoza.
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concerning issue preclusion. The Court was fully prepared to justify this
exemption on the basis of the special function played by the Solicitor
General in the management of appellate litigation in the federal court
system. The medium here reiterates the message: the Court believed it
could rely on the candor of the Solicitor General's advocacy, even when
the subject of that advocacy was the benefits provided to the federal court
system by the Solicitor General's traditional mode of operation. At the
same time, the Court found it useful to explicitly premise the special pre-
rogatives awarded the government on the Solicitor General's good
conduct.
A final limitation on this argument should be noted. The foregoing
exegesis of the Supreme Court's expectations concerning the indepen-
dence of the Solicitor General is derived entirely from what I have called
the pragmatic or judicial administration rationale for the ruling in Men-
doza. As indicated previously, however, this is but one of two broad
arguments embraced by the Court in support of its ruling. The alternate
rationale adopted by the Court sheds a somewhat different light on the
question of the Solicitor General's independence. Only by integrating the
two analyses will a complete image of the Court's expectations of the
Solicitor General emerge.
C. The Political Rationale for Mendoza
Although the judicial administration rationale would have been a
sufficient basis for rejecting the application of issue preclusion against the
government on issues of law in the absence of mutuality, in United States
v. Mendoza, 11 the Court did not rest its decision on this basis alone. In-
stead, the Court set forth an alternative rationale with a very different
flavor, one based on the inescapable policy element in government
litigation.
Government litigation, the Court observed, is an inherently political
endeavor. Because of this policy-making element, it is predictable and
quite proper for the government to change its position on the merits of
questions of law from time to time, especially when there is a change of
administrations.67 Yet collateral estoppel could prevent the executive
66. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
67. The Court stated:
In addition to those institutional concerns traditionally considered by the Solici-
tor General, the panoply of important public issues raised in governmental litigation
may quite properly lead successive administrations of the Executive Branch to take
differing positions with respect to the resolution of a particular issue. While the Ex-
ecutive Branch must of course defer to the Judicial Branch for final resolution of
questions of constitutional law, the former nonetheless controls the progress of Gov-
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branch from completing such changes of position if a decision adverse to
the government that goes unappealed for policy reasons is permitted to
bind the government in a future case in which the same question of law
arises.68 Thus, respect for the democratic character of the executive
branch of government was thought to require that collateral estoppel be
limited to prevent one administration from binding its successors on re-
curring questions of law that arise in litigation with multiple parties.6 9
ernment litigation through the federal courts. It would be idle to pretend that the
conduct of Government litigation in all its myriad features, from the decision to file a
complaint in the United States district court to the decision to petition for certiorari
to review a judgment of a court of appeals, is a wholly mechanical procedure which
involves no policy choices whatsoever.
Id. at 161 (1984).
68. This impediment to policy flexibility would operate whenever the government changed
from a restrictive view of the rights or entitlements of individuals or private entities in a partic-
ular context, to a more expansive or generous view, which leads it to acquiesce in an adverse
judicial decision, and then seeks to switch back to the restrictive view. That was the situation
that gave rise to Mendoza. See 464 U.S. at 156-57 & n.2, 161.
The same phenomenon would not operate when the zigzag course of government policy is
the reverse unless there is a party that has standing to challenge the government's adoption of
an expansive interpretation of private rights or entitlements. This, of course, often will not be
the case. Cf Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (limiting taxpayer standing); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972) (requiring objective injury in fact as a prerequisite for standing). It may be the case,
however, when the government's policy affects "private rights"-the rights of private parties
inter se, as opposed to "public rights"-claims against the government. Cf Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932) (defining these terms). The Court does not explore this point in
Mendoza. But if the effect on government policy-making of applying issue preclusion to the
government on issues of law is not neutral with respect to the content of the policies involved,
there may be all the more reason for concern.
Absent some version of the zigzag repeated change in policy direction, application of
collateral estoppel would not appear to restrain changes in government policy. If the govern-
ment's initial position on an issue is sustained by the courts, collateral estoppel would not
preclude a change in policy because the lawfulness of the opposite or different policy would not
have been fully and fairly litigated adversely to the government. See Clark-Cowlitz Joint Op-
erating Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074, 1078-81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert denied, 58
U.S.L.W. 3591 (1988). Of course, if the government's initial position is rejected by the courts,
nothing prevents the government from reversing that position.
Accordingly, the political flexibility problem discussed by the Court appears to relate
primarily, if not exclusively, to the situation such as that in Mendoza, where the government's
initial policy position is rejected, the government-motivated in whole or in part by a change
of policy perspective-seeks no further review, and then later on wishes to return to its original
position. Viewed in this light, the political rationale for Mendoza appears simply to address a
special case that falls within the general problem of regulating the flow of government appel-
late litigation through application of collateral estoppel on issues of law. The legitimacy of
policy change is simply an additional reason why the government should not lose the ability to
litigate an issue of law simply because it has once before suffered an adverse decision on the
point, and took no appeal.
69. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161-62. See supra note 68 for the practical limitations of this
argument.
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The pragmatic judicial administration rationale for the rule an-
nounced in Mendoza is founded on consideration of the interests of the
judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, and the public interest-for
which the Court assumes the role of spokesman-in the careful and de-
liberate development of public law doctrine. By contrast, the additional
justification offered for the ruling made in Mendoza rests on separation of
powers considerations and a regard for the healthy functioning of the
democratic process in the political branches of government. 70  The
Court's concern seems to be that it would be anti-democratic for the ap-
plication of issue preclusion to permanently bind the executive branch to
a position previously taken in litigation and that it is inappropriate for a
court to be the instrument that forces the executive branch into the main-
tenance of such a fixed position.
What does this political rationale add to our image of what the
Supreme Court expects from the Solicitor General? The Court recog-
nizes and accepts that litigation on behalf of the United States necessarily
involves political considerations. The entry of such political considera-
tions into the conduct of the government's litigation is not portrayed as a
taint, but as a desirable concomitant of democratic governance. This as-
sessment extends even to direct reversals of course dictated by the tides
of political fortune. Although the Solicitor General's role in implement-
ing policy changes that affect litigation is not explicitly addressed, it must
have been obvious to the Court that such policy changes would be medi-
ated through the Solicitor General's advocacy and screening activities on
behalf of the government. In that process, the Court indicates, the Solici-
tor General is not expected or required to act as a passive mirror to the
courts, simply reading back what they have said in the past. "While the
Executive Branch must of course defer to the Judicial Branch for final
resolution of questions of constitutional law,"71 the former is free to re-
quest reconsideration of doctrines previously embraced. Similarly, the
Court's opinion clearly rejects any notion that the Solicitor General
70. In Mendoza, as in the more widely noted Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984), the Court treats political flexibility and
discretion, even in the hands of an unelected official, as a positive expression of democratic
values. As Chevron, decided the same term as Mendoza, makes clear, the ultimate justification
for this position is the accountability of subordinate executive branch officials to the President
who is "directly accountable to the people." Id. at 865. See also Motor Vehicle Mfr's. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, I., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); cf id. at 57 (majority opinion striking down agency change of position follow-
ing change of administrations as arbitrary and capricious because of flaws in agency's
reasoning justifying new policy).
71. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161. But cf Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L.
REv. 979, 983 (1987).
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should adhere reflexively to positions advocated by his or her predeces-
sors on behalf of the government in the past. "[T]he panoply of impor-
tant public issues raised in governmental litigation may quite properly
lead successive administrations of the Executive Branch to take differing
positions with respect to the resolution of a particular issue."72 It was
understood that, within the domain of policy, the Solicitor General will
ordinarily serve as an advocate in the courts for the positions supported
by the incumbent administration. In addition, nothing in the Court's
opinion suggests that the Solicitor General should serve as the ultimate
repository of policy wisdom or guidance. To the contrary, the Court's
failure to mention the Solicitor General directly in the portion of its opin-
ion that outlines the political rationale for its ruling-in pointed contrast
to the balance of that opinion-suggests that the Solicitor General will be
guided on such policy matters by the position taken by the President and
the heads of those agencies whose operations are affected by particular
litigation.73 Indeed, the Court's explicit reliance on the democratic pro-
cess values that justify allowing the executive branch to change its posi-
tion from time to time, strongly implies that responsiveness to such
guidance is appropriate. Surely the Court would not have made a virtue
out of the freedom of the executive branch to change its position if such
changes reflected nothing more than the Solicitor General's change of
heart or mind.
With the addition of the political rationale of the Mendoza decision,
our portrait of the Supreme Court's expectations of the Solicitor General
acquires a new dimension of complexity, and, it might seem, an element
of contradiction. The Solicitor General is at once to play the quasi-judi-
cial role, typified by detachment, rigorous analysis and candor, in screen-
ing cases and in placing its legal submissions on the merits in the context
of existing doctrine, and the role of a partisan for the incumbent adminis-
tration's policy views as they affect the law. One aspect of this role calls
for considerable independence from the policymaking officials of the ex-
ecutive branch, the other for responsiveness to these officials. Perform-
72. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161.
73. The Court's position on this seems directly in line with that taken by the Department
of Justice Office of Legal Counsel in its 1977 Memorandum for Attorney General Griffin Bell.
While that Memorandum broadly supports the conception of an independent Solicitor Gen-
eral, it contains this qualification:
[W]e think there is no reason to suppose that... [the Solicitor General], of all the
officers in the executive branch, should have the final responsibility for deciding
what, as a matter of policy, the interests of the Government, the parties, or the Na-
tion may require.
See 1977 Memorandum, supra note 1, at 235, reprinted in 21 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1089, 1097
(1988).
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ance of this dual role is made possible, at least in part, by the elementary
fact that the Solicitor General is appointed by the President-subject to
Senate confirmation. The President thus has ample opportunity to inject
his policy views into government litigation by his choice of Solicitor Gen-
eral. Once this choice has been made other mechanisms assist the Solici-
tor General in performing this complex role.
To meet the Court's expectations, the Solicitor General must at-
tempt to perform his or her political responsibilities without abandoning
the posture required by Mendoza's judicial administration rationale.
Reconciliation of these two facets of the Solicitor General's role can be
achieved by adherence to two complementary guiding principles. First,
these two agendas for the Solicitor General ordinarily are not irreconcila-
ble. Support for administration policy, where it has a genuine bearing on
litigation, can usually be achieved without abandoning the Solicitor Gen-
eral's rigorous analysis, detachment from excessive adversarial enthusi-
asms, forthright assessment of the state of the law, or commitment to
self-regulation and restraint in exploiting the Court's resources.74
There are, however, instances when the two sets of obligations ap-
pear to collide. Consider, for instance, a situation in which an adminis-
tration's policy strongly dictates support for a particular outcome on a
question of law with strong policy overtones, such as abortion, school
busing for the purpose of desegregation or the availability of habeas
corpus relief to a convicted criminal defendant who had been indicted by
a grand jury from which all black persons intentionally have been ex-
cluded. Assume further that the government has legally respectable ar-
guments to be made, but that all of these arguments have been made to
the Court, and rejected, in previous cases. To add a bit more interest to
the situation, assume further that the government had previously taken
74. A good example is provided by the brief fied by the Solicitor General early in the
Reagan Administration in a little-known case called Lord v. Local Union 2088, Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, cert denied, 458 U.S. 1106 (1982). The case involved right-to-work law issues
and there was a strong feeling among political appointees at the agency level that the United
States should support the grant of the certiorari petition. The Supreme Court had requested
that the Solicitor General file a brief reflecting the views of the United States. The administra-
tion was thus sympathetic to the views of the petitioner on the merits, but the Solicitor General
was simply unable to conclude that the case met any accepted criterion for "certworthiness."
The brief fied by the United States reflected this dual position explicitly. After meticulously
reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the legal contentions on both sides of the case, the
brief concludes that Supreme Court review would not be justified, because none of the usual
indicia for discretionary review were present. The administration's policy preference for en-
forcement of state right to work laws was duly stated. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 18, Lord v. Local Union No. 2088, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1106 (1982). But the conclusion still read: "Applying this Court's customary criteria for re-
view on the merits, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied." Id. at 19.
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the opposite side of the particular question before the Court, and had
been vindicated in that advocacy. Finally, assume that there is simply no
reason to believe that the Court will deem the issue ripe for reconsidera-
tion in the particular case, and that the government has no argument for
reconsideration other than its disagreement with the previous ruling. In
these circumstances, is it appropriate for the Solicitor General to file a
certiorari petition, or an amicus brief supporting reconsideration?
The key to discerning an answer-at least an answer from the per-
spective of the Mendoza Court-lies in recognizing the interdependence
of the twin rationales of that case. Mendoza acknowledged that it was
necessary and proper for the government, through the Solicitor General,
to alter a previously adopted stance on an "important public issue[]
raised in governmental litigation."7 Indeed, the rule of law adopted in
Mendoza was crafted in part to make sure that it remains possible for the
government to do just this. At the same time, the dimensions of the
Solicitor General's freedom to alter a previously adopted stance cannot
be understood without remembering the Court's judicial administration
rationale. The Supreme Court's willingness to allow the Solicitor Gen-
eral this freedom depends on the Court's conviction that the government
exercises a high level of self-restraint in its dealings with the Court. It is
therefore an abuse of the privileges accorded to the government, through
its attorney, the Solicitor General, to make this kind of submission to the
Court, in any but the most compelling circumstances. The desire of one
administration to advise the Supreme Court that it disagrees with the
position adopted by its predecessors is not a sufficient reason for doing
so. In the situation described above, there is no sufficient justification for
the Solicitor General to make the argument supported by administration
policy.7 6 The Court's recognition of a legitimately and inescapably polit-
ical dimension to governmental advocacy does not free the Solicitor Gen-
eral from all restraints on his or her conduct. To the contrary, the
privileges and the advantages extended to the government in Supreme
Court litigation and in the conduct of its appellate litigation business gen-
erally underscore the responsibility that must channel and temper polit-
ical advocacy.
75. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161.
76. Caplan provides an account of the Solicitor General's handling of the case on which
this "hypothetical" is modeled, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986). L. CAPLAN, supra
note 2, at 92-95. Solicitor General Lee declined to authorize government participation in the
case.
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II. THE VIEW FROM CAPITOL HILL
In the first section of this Article I have attempted to look at the
conduct of the Solicitor General and his or her staff from the perspective
of the Supreme Court. In this section I look at the work of the Solicitor
General from the viewpoint of the legislative branch of the United States
government, the Congress. I shall argue that the Solicitor General, as
the lawyer for the United States in the Supreme Court, has responsibili-
ties that run not only to the executive branch, and the President as its
head, but also to the Congress. I do not question that the Solicitor Gen-
eral serves an executive branch function, is properly located within that
branch, and may only be appointed by the President-with the advice
and consent of the Senate. Indeed, even assuming the continuing vitality
of Humphrey's Executor v. United States,7 I very much doubt that the
Congress could not constitutionally grant tenure or otherwise restrict the
President's power to fire or direct the conduct of the Solicitor General.
Instead, I shall argue that the independence of the Solicitor General,
within the executive branch, permits him to act in a manner that reduces
inter-branch conflict, by displaying due regard for the interests of the
legislative branch. Recognition of these obligations to the Congress safe-
guards our system of separation of powers because it makes it unneces-
sary in all but extraordinary cases for the Congress to retain its own
counsel and become embroiled in inter-branch litigation. At the same
time, recognition of these obligations is required for the executive branch
to respect the Congress' role as the primary lawmaking arm of our gov-
ernment. In short, precisely because the conduct of litigation on behalf
of the United States belongs in the executive branch, but powerfully af-
fects the interests of the legislative branch, the Solicitor General should
operate with considerable independence from the top political officials of
the Executive. This arrangement is not required by the text of the Con-
stitution or the doctrine of separation of powers commonly understood
to be lurking in the structure of text. But it is a powerful and valuable
bulwark for separation of powers that should command our respect and
our allegiance.
At least two aspects of government litigation vitally and directly af-
fect the interests of the legislative branch. These are the interpretation of
statutes and the defense of their constitutionality. It is the handiwork of
the Congress that is up for definition whenever issues of statutory inter-
77. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). But cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3188 n.4 (1986)
(formally pretermitting the question, but sometimes read to cast a cloud on the continuing
vitality of Humphrey's Executor).
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pretation arise in litigation. And the very vitality of the legislative work-
product is obviously at stake when the constitutionality of an act of Con-
gress is challenged in litigation. In his twin role as the government's
Supreme Court litigator and overseer of the pyramid of federal appellate
litigation, the Solicitor General plays a critical role in both kinds of cases.
It is the Solicitor General who decides whether an appeal should be
taken to the Supreme Court when any lower federal court has held an act
of Congress unconstitutional in a case to which the government is a
party.7 8 It is likewise the Solicitor General who determines whether the
United States should intervene-or file a brief amicus curiae-to defend
the constitutionality of any act of Congress, when a constitutional chal-
lenge is raised in an action to which the government is not already a
party.7 9 When issues of statutory interpretation arise, it is the Solicitor
General who will have to address them on behalf of the United States in
the Supreme Court. And the Solicitor General's control over authoriza-
tion of government appeals to the courts of appeals also gives him or her
a substantial degree of control over the manner in which the government
will approach statutory interpretation in the lower courts.80 This much
is unremarkable. What happens, however, when the interests of the leg-
islative branch and the policy preferences of the administration in the
executive branch collide in this arena? Such clashes do occur. How
should the Solicitor General conduct himself or herself in such a setting?
The question is presented in most dramatic form when the constitu-
tionality of an act of Congress is at issue. What if the challenged statute
is one that the President or the Attorney General considers unwise-
perhaps one enacted over the President's veto? What if the Attorney
General or the President considers the challenged statute unconstitu-
tional? Perhaps it is a statute restricting-or extending-the right to
abortions or a statute that places intrusive requirements on state or local
government. What is the obligation of the Solicitor General in such a
situation? May he or she simply decline to take an appeal from a deci-
sion striking down such a statute on the ground that the administration
disfavored the enactment of the statute, or because the President or At-
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982) (direct appeal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); see also
supra note 1 and accompanying text.
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (1982) (requiring certification of such cases to Attorney Gen-
eral by any court in which such case is pending); 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.20 (c), 0.21 (1987) (authority
of Solicitor General to determine whether intervention or amicus participation shall take
place).
80. The Solicitor General also has control over the government's ability to intervene or file
briefs amicus curiae in nongovernment cases, in the Supreme Court and in the lower courts,
that present questions of federal law. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20 (c) (1987).
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torney General believes that the Supreme Court ought to disapprove the
statute? Alternatively, does the Solicitor General have an obligation to
take an appeal in such a case, but remain free to oppose the constitution-
ality of the statute on the merits in the Supreme Court? Or does the
Solicitor General have an obligation to defend the constitutionality of an
act of Congress regardless of the administration's view of the statute?
If the Solicitor General takes no appeal in such a case, or opposes
the constitutionality of the statute on its merits, Congress can intervene
through its own lawyers to defend the constitutionality of the statute.
This practice appears to have increased in recent years.8 But where the
Congress intervenes through its own lawyers, the United States may
speak with more than one voice in the courts and the executive branch
necessarily forfeits its natural monopoly on the function of litigating in
the name of the United States. Moreover, the Solicitor General's fidelity
to the constitutional command that the executive branch "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed,"82 is opened to question. This is espe-
cially so when the Executive's objection to the statute is purely polit-
ical-i.e., motivated by considerations other than concern for the
unconstitutionality of the statute. Such a refusal to defend the constitu-
tionality of an act of Congress would detract doubly from the constitu-
tional separation of powers. It tends to negate the supremacy of
Congress as the lawmaking branch, as well as to countenance faithless
execution of the laws. A cardinal virtue of the independence that has
traditionally been extended to the Solicitor General is that it protects the
nation from the inter-branch collision that would result from such con-
duct by lawyers purporting to represent the United States.
What if leaders of the executive branch entertain a genuine belief
that the statute challenged is unconstitutional? The foregoing analysis
remains applicable in most respects. To fail to defend the act of Congress
is both to abandon the Executive's constitutional role and to undermine
that of the Congress. There is, of course, one significant difference in this
setting. If the statute is indeed unconstitutional, it is not entitled to en-
forcement. An obligation not to enforce it may exist.83 But the conven-
tional response to this dilemma is to defer to the courts, which uniquely
81. Lawyers for the Congress intervened for this purpose in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
930 n.5, 939 (1983), and in Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). As these examples
illustrate, the increasing use of this practice results primarily from the increased incidence of
litigation turning directly on separation of powers issues that pit the institutional interests of
the executive branch directly against those of the Congress. See infra text accompanying notes
84-85.
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
83. Whether there can be any such obligation absent an authoritative judicial decision
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possess the authority to decide the constitutionality question in a manner
that commands the adherence of all other branches and of private indi-
viduals. Because unconstitutionality is rarely plain, statutes are to be
treated as part of the law to be enforced and defended by the Executive
until authoritatively condemned as extra-constitutional.
This, in fact, is the traditional position of the Solicitor General and
the Department of Justice in such cases. The constitutionality of acts of
Congress is to be defended in all cases, unless no professionally respecta-
ble argument can be made in defense of the statute.8 4 A single exception
to this firm rule has been recognized: the Executive remains free to advo-
cate its own interests in any case in which an act of Congress is chal-
lenged on the ground that legislative action unconstitutionally invades
the prerogatives reserved to the executive branch." Under the general
rule stated above, the Solicitor General fully recognizes and fulfills the
obligation that runs to the branch responsible for making the laws, from
the branch responsible for their execution. Statutes are defended before
the courts unless their defense is futile. In this way, statutes receive rec-
ognition as part of the law that must be faithfully executed. Under this
general rule the Solicitor General fully discharges the role of the lawyer
for the United States, rather than lawyer for any one branch of govern-
ment or for the President or Attorney General personally. The tradi-
tional independence of the Solicitor General from direct political control
by the President and the Attorney General makes it possible for the So-
licitor General to perform in this manner as the lawyer for the Nation.
When the Executive believes, however, that the Congress has uncon-
stitutionally invaded the province of the Executive, the foregoing analysis
breaks down. The relationship of the two branches in litigation becomes
directly adversarial. The conflict then is one between the two political
branches themselves and not simply between the views held by particular
occupants of the two branches at some point in time. When the Execu-
tive believes that the constitutional rights or powers of the executive
branch have been infringed by a challenged statute, resort must be had to
the judicial branch, the only one that possesses the authority to resolve
disapproving the statute seems much more doubtful. See Waas & Toobin, Meese's Power Grab,
The New Republic, May 19, 1986, at 15.
84. Whatever ambiguity may theoretically be lurking in the statement of this criterion, it
has generally been comprehensible to those who administer it and its administration has rarely
provoked controversy.
85. This exception has been resorted to in a number of important recent cases that raised
separation of powers issues concerning legislative action arguably infringing on executive
branch responsibilities. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, and Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, both fall into this
category. See supra note 81.
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the inter-branch controversy. In such litigation, which historically has
been rare, but which is of great constitutional import when it occurs, it
has been thought preferable to allow the branches to litigate before the
courts, each with its own counsel, in the conventional adversary fashion.
In such exceptional cases the Solicitor General has served as counsel for
the Executive.
Congress has enacted several statutes that reflect the expectation
that the Solicitor General will defend the constitutionality of acts of Con-
gress challenged on constitutional grounds. It has regularly inserted in
Department of Justice Appropriations Acts language requiring the At-
torney General to report to officers of the House and the Senate any oc-
casion on which the Department of Justice does not defend the
constitutionality of an act of Congress.86 In those relatively rare in-
stances where the occasion for such a report has arisen, the Attorney
General has forwarded a letter, drafted in the Office of the Solicitor Gen-
eral, to the proper congressional officials. At least prior to the advent of
the Reagan Administration, the letter that was prepared and transmitted
expressly acknowledged the" 'oblig[ation] to defend the constitutionality
of Acts of Congress in all but the most unusual circumstances.' "87
It is possible to argue for a somewhat broader role for the Solicitor
General in deciding whether to defend the constitutionality of an act of
Congress, where the incumbent administration considers the statute un-
constitutional-in effect a policy of executive activism on constitutional
issues.8a (By contrast, I find no plausible argument for permitting the
86. See, e.g., Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979,
Pub. L. No. 95-624, § 13, 92 Stat. 3464 (1978) (set forth as note under 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1982));
Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
132, § 21, 93 Stat. 1049-50 (1979) (set forth as note under 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1982)). 28 U.S.C.
§ 2403(a) (1982) complements these provisions by attempting to make certain that the Attor-
ney General is made aware of every case-even one to which there is no government party-in
which the constitutionality of a federal statute comes under attack. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
87. E.g., Letter from Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti to Vice President Walter
Mondale, in his role as President of the United States Senate (Jan. 13, 1981), (quoted in L.
CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 132 &
n.70 (1987)). Caplan reports that Attorney General William French Smith toned down this
affirmation and that Attorney General Edwin Meese deleted it entirely. Id. at 132. Caplan
argues that this was emblematic of a generalized attack by Attorney General Meese on the
doctrine of judicial supremacy. Id. at 115-34. See generally Meese, supra note 71. The cited
statement of the Attorney General's views appears in a symposium issue of the Tulane Law
Review. See Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 TUL. L. REV.
977 (1987) [hereinafter Tulane Symposium]. (This symposium on the Attorney General's con-
troversial views on judicial supremacy that should be of significant interest to readers of the
present symposium.)
88. This depends in part on the view taken of judicial supremacy on questions of constitu-
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lawyer for the United States to decline to defend the constitutionality of
an act of Congress simply because the administration has nonconstitu-
tional objections to the statute.) Two objectives might conceivably be
served by withholding the Solicitor General's support in the courts from
a statute that the administration deems unconstitutional. One is instru-
mental: the incremental impact that the presentation-or withholding-
of the Executive's views may have on the ultimate judicial judgment.
The other is symbolic: the fulfillment of the felt imperative to "speak
truth to power." I do not suggest that either justification for such execu-
tive constitutional activism is devoid of weight. However, the cost in
terms of erosion of separation of powers is high. To allow or compel the
Solicitor General to follow a strategy of executive constitutional activism
by serving as an advocate for the incumbent administration's constitu-
tional policy is to undermine our system of separation of powers. There
are several dimensions, 15ractical and theoretical, to this corrosive effect.
All of them create unwanted tension in the operation of the constitu-
tional plan of our federal government.
As already noted, any departure from the obligation to defend the
constitutionality of acts of Congress would encourage the Congress to
become regularly engaged in the business of litigation, claiming a share
of the mantle of representation of the United States before the courts.
This is a phenomenon that has become more common in recent years, in
part because of increasingly frequent direct clashes between legislative
enactments and executive branch prerogatives.89 No reason exists, how-
ever, to spur that development further. To do so diverts both the Con-
gress and the Executive from the legitimate political means by which
policy disagreements between the political branches, even those over is-
sues of constitutional law, are ordinarily resolved. Further erosion of
separation of powers would result if Congress were to respond by at-
tempting to limit the President's control over the conduct of government
litigation presenting such issues, or to assert direct control over the con-
duct of the Solicitor General.90 Ironically, such executive constitutional
tional law and the effect-: "binding" or otherwise-of judicial decisions on the other branches.
See Tulane Symposium, supra note 87. Even if one accepts the Attorney General's argument
that the executive branch is entitled to maintain its own view on a question of constitutional
law, subject only to the obligation to respect the judgments of the courts, see Meese, supra note
71, at 983, 985-86, it does not necessarily follow that the Solicitor General should not defend
the constitutionality of statutes the administration considers unconstitutional. Attorney Gen-
eral Meese's argument takes no account of the obligation the lawyer for the United States has
to the Congress to represent Congress' view that it has acted constitutionally.
89. See Greenhouse, Many Pitfalls on the Path From Congress to Court, N.Y. Times, Feb.
25, 1988, at B6, col. 2.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 113-17.
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activism forces the Supreme Court, in fulfilling its ordained role as final
arbiter of constitutional interpretation, to play an undesirably expanded
role as mediator of squabbles between the branches. This is hardly a
strategy for those who wish to reduce the role of the courts as lawgivers
in our society.
At the same time that the Congress is forced by executive constitu-
tional activism to adopt an executive role, the Executive assumes a role
that is either legislative or judicial: as a law-maker. If the Executive's
constitutional scruples about a statute are borne out by the courts, this
role is largely redundant of the judicial role. But if the courts would
reject the executive position, the refusal to defend the constitutionality of
a statute appears as a challenge to-or an attempt to share-legislative
authority. In contrast to a strategy of executive constitutional activism,
the traditional operations of the Solicitor General in this area represent
the path toward fostering comity and respect between the branches. Ed-
win S. Kneedler, a senior Assistant to the Solicitor General, has ex-
plained the virtue of the latter approach elegantly:
"[T]here are few occasions when one branch of government
speaks directly to the other: the State of the Union address;
proposals for new laws; vetoes of legislation. There is a great
deal of diplomacy about them. Our filings in the Supreme
Court are on this short list, and our faith in separation of pow-
ers requires us to be respectful as well." 91
This is a salutary tradition, one of faith in the separation of powers, and
respect by each branch of government for the prerogatives of the others.
I would not see it discarded.
Similar role conflicts arise in less dramatic form in connection with
questions of statutory interpretation. When federal legislation must be
interpreted in litigation, what is the proper objective for the Solicitor
General's advocacy? May he or she attempt to vindicate an interpreta-
tion of the statute that conforms to incumbent administration policy, or
the position that the administration favored in the legislative process,
even though the Congress may have intended to reject that position? Or
must the Solicitor General seek out and urge upon the courts the inter-
pretation that best conforms to congressional intent---even where that
intent departs from administration policies? These questions about the
Solicitor General's obligations to his client, raise concerns distinct from
91. Statement of Edwin S. Kneedler (quoted in L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW at 211-12 (1987)).
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the Solicitor General's relationship with the Supreme Court, considered
in the first section of this Article.
The problem presented by statutory interpretation litigation differs
from that concerning constitutionality of statutes in several important
respects. First, Congress retains the power to clarify its intentions
through further legislation if the Executive successfully urges upon the
courts a mistaken, unfaithful or distorted interpretation of existing legis-
lation. The same is not true when the courts strike down legislation on
constitutional grounds. While this attenuates the problem to some de-
gree, it does not eliminate it, for the Congress ought not have to resort to
this expedient to secure faithful adherence to its already-expressed intent.
Moreover, the obligation of fidelity to congressional intent, if it is recog-
nized, is owed not to the present incumbent Congress, but to the legisla-
tive branch as a whole and specifically to the Congress that enacted the
statute in question. The latter may no longer be available to correct a
judicial error encouraged by executive advocacy.
Second, problems of statutory interpretation most often present
themselves today in an administrative law-making setting. Thus, the liti-
gation in which such problems arise will typically be an action for judi-
cial review of agency action in the form of regulations or an adjudicatory
administrative decision. In such cases, the initial interpretation of the
statute has been rendered by an administrative agency acting pursuant to
authority delegated explicitly or implicitly.92 In such cases, one facet of
the Solicitor General's duty to his or her client, the United States, is to
defend the agency action. But this does not foreclose argument about the
Solicitor General's duty in this situation; it merely complicates the situa-
tion further. In fact, there are three competing conceptions of the duty
to client of the lawyer for the United States to be considered in this situa-
tion: (1) a duty to the Congress to determine, independently of the
agency or administration policy, whether or not agency action conforms
to Congress' intentions; (2) a duty to the President to frame a position
that reflects the administration's view of the law and of appropriate pol-
icy; and (3) a duty to the agency itself to make all professionally required
efforts to defend the agency's action. Moreover, the Solicitor General's
duty to his or her client is also conditioned by the special relationship
with the Supreme Court, described previously.
The traditional independence of the Solicitor General helps to rec-
oncile and to balance these competing conceptions of the Solicitor Gen-
92. See, ag., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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eral's responsibility in this situation. The centralization of Supreme
Court litigation in the Solicitor General-together with the Solicitor
General's jurisdiction to screen the appeals of many government agen-
cies-necessarily restrains the representation of agency interests. This
restraint ensures that the government speaks with a single consistent
voice on legal issues.93 It also subjects the agencies to the self-restrained
advocacy style I have examined in the first section of this Article, with its
attendant long range benefits for the executive branch as a whole, as well
as its limiting effects. The independence of the Solicitor General is, with
respect to the agencies, a rejection of unqualified agency independence in
litigation before the courts.94 At the same time, the Solicitor General is
expected to carefully consult with each agency involved or affected by a
pending case, and to give the legal and policy arguments advanced by the
affected entity the most serious consideration.9" Insulation of the Solici-
tor General from the top political leaders of the executive branch enables
the Solicitor General to give agency perspectives substantial weight with-
out discounting broader governmental interests or the policy perspectives
of the President and the Attorney General.
The traditions of the Solicitor General's operation also help to ease
the tension between executive interests and legislative interests in statu-
tory interpretation cases. In this situation, to be sure, the attorney for
the United States is subject to divergent interests somewhat akin to those
arising when an act of Congress is challenged as an infringement of exec-
utive branch power.9 6 Thus, we cannot realistically expect the Solicitor
General to be wholly neutral as between executive and legislative inter-
ests here. Yet the problems engendered are considerably less severe be-
cause the issues are nonconstitutional. Congress' .weaponry for
overcoming a judicial decision inconsistent with its intent in the area of
statutory interpretation is considerably greater than when unconstitu-
tionality is at stake. Perhaps for that reason, and because of partisan
divisions within the Congress, Congress as a body is less likely to secure
counsel and enter into litigation whenever lawyers for the executive
93. See 1977 Memorandum, supra note 1, at 230, reprinted in 21 Loy. L.A.L. Rnv. 1089,
1092 (1988).
94. See id, reprinted in 21 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1988).
95. Id at 233-34, reprinted in 21 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1089, 1095 (1988). In The Tenth
Justice, Caplan charges that Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds pressured
the Solicitor General to deviate from this practice in connection with Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), a case in which the Solicitor General ultimately filed no
brief. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 90-92.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
1160
June 1988] SOLICITOR GENERAL'S INDEPENDENCE
branch advance a statutory reading that does not comport with legisla-
tive intent.
Congress, however, can be provoked into action. If executive
branch lawyers were to dishonor expressed legislative intent in statutory
interpretation cases in clear-cut fashion, the inter-branch tensions dis-
cussed above would begin to well up. The commitment of the Executive
to the faithful execution of the laws would be placed in doubt and the
Congress prompted to join in litigation.97 If the Executive made a regu-
lar practice of this it would begin to disrupt the key assumptions upon
which the federal government functions from day to day. The indepen-
dence of the Solicitor General provides a valuable bulwark against such
disruption, though it affords no guarantees. Indeed, if the Solicitor Gen-
eral behaves as the Supreme Court expects him to, the opportunity for
subversion of legislative intent is limited. Candid and rigorous assess-
ment of the merits of cases presented to the Court will sidetrack many of
the cases in which the agencies or the President have flouted the ex-
pressed will of Congress. The need to winnow the caseload to fit the
dockets of the courts will help as well. In other instances the case will go
forward, but the Solicitor General's forthright advocacy win assist the
courts in vindicating legislative intent even while he or she may urge an
opposite result upon the Court.9" In fulfilling the expectations of the
Supreme Court, the Solicitor General will simultaneously minimize fric-
tion between the Executive and the Congress as well. By employing his
independence to strike a balance among the competing conceptions of his
duty, the Solicitor General fosters a desirable regime of comity among
the branches of government.
Lest these observations appear entirely abstract or noncontroversial,
let me point out a contemporary context in which adherence to the
course of restraint advocated here seems to be very much in doubt-at
least in some quarters of the Justice Department and in the White House.
President Reagan recently issued Executive Order Number 12,612 on the
97. Caplan charges that this occurred in the formulation of the Solicitor General's submis-
sion in Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). In this instance a number of members of
Congress were prompted to file their own brief amicus curiae addressing the statutory interpre-
tation question in the Supreme Court. L. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 240-44.
98. based upon my experience as an Assistant to the Solicitor General, I believe that law-
yers in that Office have taken an expansive view of the lawyer's obligation to cite opposing
"authority" to the courts in the special situation in which there is relatively obscure legislative
history that tends to conflict with the government's position. I recall in particular one case in
which highly obscure legislative history divulged in the government's brief formed a key link in
the opinion of the Supreme Court rejecting the government's position. See United States v.
Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 438-40 (1983).
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subject of federalism.99 The stated purpose of the Executive Order is to
"restore the division of governmental responsibilities between the na-
tional government and the States that was intended by the Framers of the
Constitution and to ensure that the principles of federalism established
by the Framers guide the Executive departments and agencies in the for-
mulation and implementation of policies. ' '" °° The Executive Order con-
tains a ringing affirmation of states' rights and limitation of federal
power, and imposes federalism policymaking criteria on federal agen-
cies.10 1 In addition, the Executive Order attempts to breathe some life
back into National League of Cities v. Usery,1°2 by prohibiting executive
departments and agencies from submitting legislative proposals to Con-
gress that violate the short-lived test for constitutional federalism that
Justice Rehnquist announced in that case.103 Of greater concern for
present purposes, however, are the provisions of the Executive Order
governing preemption of state law by federal law, and by federal regula-
tions. Section 4(a) requires federal agencies to take a narrow view of the
preemptive reach of the statutes under which they operate."° In addi-
99. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 1230-33 (Oct. 26, 1987).
See Moore, Federalism Renewed, with Reservations, Nat'l J., Jan. 30, 1988, at 274-75.
100. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 99, at 1230.
101. Section 2 of Exec. Order No. 12,612 enumerates "Fundamental Federalism Princi-
ples." These include:
(a) Federalism is rooted in the knowledge that our political liberties are best
protected by limiting the size and scope of the national government.
(c) The constitutional relationship among sovereign governments, State and na-
tional, is formalized in and protected by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.
(i) In the absence of clear constitutional or statutory authority, the presumption
of sovereignty should rest with the individual States. Uncertainties regarding the
legitimate authority of national government should be resolved against regulation at
the national level.
Id at 1231. "[T]o the extent permitted by law," executive departments and agencies are di-
rected to adhere to a set of "Federalism Policymaking Criteria" listed in Section 3 of the
Executive Order. Id at 1231-32.
102. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985)).
103. Section 5 of the Executive Order proscribes legislative proposals that would "(a) Di-
rectly regulate the States in ways that would interfere with functions essential to the States'
separate and independent existence or operate to directly displace the States' freedom to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional government functions ... ." Exec. Order No.
12,612, supra note 99, at 1232. The quoted language is borrowed directly from the Court's
now-overruled decision in National League of Cities. See 426 U.S. at 844, 852 (overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
104. Section 4(a) provides:
To the extent permitted by law, Executive departments and agencies shall con-
strue, in regulations and otherwise, a Federal statute to preempt State law only when
the statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other firm and
palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that Congress intended the preemption
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tion, when a federal statute interpreted in this restrictive manner does
not itself preempt state law, but does grant rulemaking authority to a
federal agency, the Executive Order denies the agency the authority to
make rules that preempt state law unless
the statute expressly authorizes issuance of preemptive regula-
tions or there is some other firm and palpable evidence compel-
ling the conclusion that the Congress intended to delegate to
the ... agency the authority to issue regulations preempting
State law.105
All executive departments and agencies are admonished to utilize this
standard to "construe any authorization in... [a] statute for the issuance
of ,106of regulations ....,,o
The problem with this last provision is simple: the Supreme Court
has only recently made clear that this is not the standard that governs
whether an agency may, by its regulations, preempt state law. The opin-
ion of the Court in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De La
Cuesta 107 is unambiguous on this score. The Court explained that the
only issues in this setting are whether the agency intended to preempt
state law and whether, apart from its preemptive effect, the agency had
been delegated authority to adopt the regulation in question.10 8 By con-
of State law, or when the exercise of state authority directly conflicts with the exer-
cise of Federal authority under the Federal statute.
Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 99, at 1232.
This formulation of a standard for determining the applicability of federal preemption
appears to conflict with Supreme Court caselaw that allows implication of the intent to pre-
empt upon a much more modest showing. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947).
105. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 99, at 1232.
106. Id.
107. 458 U.S. 141 (1982). This case was successfully litigated by the Solicitor General's
Office early in the Reagan Administration under Solicitor General Rex E. Lee.
108. Id. at 154. The Court explained the relevant principles as follows:
Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes. Where
Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are
subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory
authority or acted arbitrarily. When the administrator promulgates regulations in-
tended to pre-empt state law, the court's inquiry is similarly limited: "If [h]is choice
represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed
to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the
statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress
would have sanctioned."
Id. at 153-54 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)). If
the regulations are, apart from their preemptive character, within the federal administrator's
delegated authority, the burden was thus placed on the opponent of the regulations to show
that Congress meant to preclude the promulgation of regulations with preemptive effect. The
approach taken by Section 4(b) of Executive Order No. 12,612 is, in this respect, precisely the
reverse.
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trast, an analysis that "focus[ed] on Congress' intent to supersede state
law" was labeled "misdirected."' 0 9
To the extent that federal litigators are subject to these provisions,
they create the kind of problem of conflicting loyalties that is discussed
above. To put a fine point on the matter, if a case like De La Cuesta were
to arise again today, would the Solicitor General be bound by the Execu-
tive Order to decline to urge the validity of the preemptive regulations
there involved?110 Whatever the lawful effect of the Executive Order
may be, 1 ' I would urge that its application to the conduct of the Solici-
tor General be resisted. For the President to revise the shape of the
preemption doctrine, and then require the Solicitor General to apply this
executive branch conception of the law, will result in unfair surprise to
the Congress. Congress, guided by the prevailing Supreme Court
caselaw, could properly have assumed that the authority of federal agen-
cies to preempt state law by their regulations need not be expressly stated
in federal statutes. The ethic of inter-branch comity advocated here
would be violated if the Solicitor General acts on the President's idiosyn-
cratic view of the applicable law." 2
109. Id.
110. To pose this question requires us to assume that preemptive regulations have been
promulgated by a federal agency without the clear indication of congressional intent to author-
ize preemption that is required under the standard set forth in the Executive Order. There will
be no such regulations in the future if agencies consider themselves bound by the Executive
Order, although there may be litigation about existing regulations. (The Executive Order does
not appear to require systematic reconsideration under its criteria of existing regulations.) Of
course, there is a question, distinct from that proposed in the text, as to whether the President
can lawfully restrict the authority of agencies to issue preemptive regulations that would,
under the Supreme Court's view of the law, be permissible. This latter question turns partly on
congressional intent, and partly on the extent of the inherent authority, if any, of the President
to direct the exercise of discretionary authority conferred on executive branch entities. Com-
pare Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981) with Office of Legal
Counsel, Memorandum for Honorable David Stockman Re. Proposed Executive Order on Fed-
eral Regulation, reprinted in J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 150-55 (2d ed. 1985).
111. See supra note 110.
112. Lawyers on the Solicitor General's staff have informed me that incumbent Solicitor
General, Charles Fried, recognizing this difficulty, was responsible for the addition of moderat-
ing language to the Executive Order. Apparently the Executive Order as originally drafted
allowed regulations to be given preemptive effect only when a statute expressly so authorizes.
The present text allows as an alternative basis for such regulations "other firm and palpable
evidence compelling the conclusion that the congress intended" to delegate preemptive
rulemaking authority. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 99, at 1232. The change, while in
the right direction, does not appear to me sufficient to eliminate the difficulty.
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III. CONCLUSION
The Solicitor General's relative independence from intrusive super-
vision by the political leaders of the executive branch has a salutary im-
pact on the administration of our judicial system. Additionally, it
promotes the orderly development of judge-made law in response to the
most pressing needs of society for clarification or change in the law. This
same tradition of independence provides a needed lubricant that eases
tensions between the Executive and the Congress and helps to reconcile
conflicting interests affecting the interpretation and enforcement of statu-
tory law. Given these beneficial effects, it might be thought appropriate
to consider what protection could be provided by law for the indepen-
dence of the Solicitor General. In the past, when Congress has wished to
insulate an executive function from the control of the President, it has
used several expedients. Salient among these is the granting of tenure to,
an executive official by conditioning removal of that official upon a show-
ing of good cause. 1 '3 Could Congress restrict the power of the President
to remove the Solicitor General and at the same time designate the Solici-
tor General by statute as the Officer exclusively responsible for the func-
tions that he now carries out? Could Congress go still further and
reserve the power of appointment or removal of the Solicitor General to
itself? Caselaw provides relatively clear negative answers to most of
these questions. Bowsher v. Synar"4 precludes direct congressional con-
trol over removal of the Solicitor General. Buckley v. ValeoI 5 precludes
congressional control-beyond the constitutionally mandated "Advice
and consent"-over appointment of the Solicitor General. Under
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,16 Congress has been permitted to
impose "cause" requirements for the removal of certain administrative
officials exercising what have been described as quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative functions, while such requirements are impermissible as to
"purely executive officers.""' 7 Whatever may ultimately be decided
about the constitutionality of placing law enforcement authority in the
hands of an "independent regulatory commission"-an issue that has not
been conclusively resolved by the courts-the duties of the Solicitor Gen-
113. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935). Other devices
include creation of multi-member collegially governed agencies, with staggered terms of office
and bipartisan membership requirements. Id. Wholly apart from any legal objections thereto,
collegial governance does not appear feasible for the operations of the Office of the Solicitor
General.
114. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
115. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
116. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
117. Id. at 629-31.
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eral must be classified as "purely executive" for this purpose. This is true
notwithstanding the powerful congressional interest-and that of the
courts-in the manner in which the Solicitor General conducts himself,
or herself, as the lawyer for the United States. Viewed in conjunction,
the authority to conduct Supreme Court litigation on behalf of the
United States, and the broad power of the Solicitor General over most of
the field of federal appellate litigation, lie close to the heart of the Presi-
dent's duty to supervise the faithful execution of the laws-too close, I
submit, to admit of any legislative interposition.
If statutory tenure is impermissible, what then? I suggest that the
answer does not lie in crafting ingenious-but constitutionally dubious-
legal restraints on the authority of the President or the Attorney General
over the conduct of the Solicitor General. Such devices are ordinarily
unnecessary because of the shared interest of the Supreme Court and the
Executive in maintaining the advantages that accrue to both from the
relative independence of the Solicitor General. When such built-in safe-
guards prove insufficient, efforts by Congress to restrain executive con-
trol over the Solicitor General only compound the separation of powers
difficulties that arise from excessive partisanship on the executive side.
The preservation of the appropriate independence of the Solicitor Gen-
eral must instead be a task for political action and a test of political re-
sponsibility. What is at stake here is, indeed, our faith in the separation
of powers.
1 18
118. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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